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ABSTRACT
Communication privacy and user authentication have become important issues in data
communications, especially for high speed (e.g., 64 Kbits/sec to 120 Mbits/sec) digital satellite
communications. The recently proposed )ata Encryption Standard (1)1S) might not be desirable
for many applications in high-speed data transmission via satellites, because of the potential
problems of key distribution and key management associated with the conventional cryptosystems.
Public-key cryptosystems have been proposed to alleviate the problems of key distribution and key
management. This dissertation incorporates mathematical analysis and computer techniques to
perform cryptanalysis on the Rabin and Williams schemes, thereby determining some of the
properties which would help in assessing its suitability for high speed satellite communication
applications.
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81 PRELIMINARIES
1.! INTRODUCTION
With the arising need for data communications and data processing, cryptography has been
considered as an important means to provide communication privacy and message authenticity. The
application of cryptography is no longer limited to military or diplomatic communities.
Some previously known schemes for privacy of communications include the one-time cipher,
running key cipher, Hagelin Machine, rotor machines, linear feedback shift registers, etc.. These
schemes are called "conventional" because they use the identical key for both enciphering and
deciphering. The message must be encoded by an encipherer using this particular key before it is
sent. The receiver would then use the same key in the decipherer to perform the inverse operation of
the encipherer, and thereby decode the message. Thus, security of the system is dependent upon the
key and therefore, it must be kept secret.
Key management has been an important aspect of communication security. It is required for
any key-controlled cryptographic algorithm. Key management requires a protocol for safely handling
and controlling its cryptographic keys. This protocol involves issues such as: who should have access
to which part of the key, who should generate and maintain the keys, how the keys should be
protected, and how the keys should be changed.
Another major aspect of communication security of key distribution. Key distribution is the
transporting or roLiting of cryptographic keys through the cryptographic system for subsequent
installation into the designated cryptographic devices. Key distribution involves issues such as: how
the keys should be distributed securely to authorized users, who should distribute the keys, and how
to assure that the keys are properly distributed.
To alleviate these problems of key distribution and key management, Hellman invented the
concept of public-key, which uses a one-way trap-door function. In this concept, two separate keys
are employed for encryption and decryption. The decryption key is kept secret by the receiver while
the encryption key is made public. The encryption and decryption algorithms are known to every
user. Knowing the encryption key without knowing the decryption key makes it practically
impossible for one to decrypt the message. The simplicity is made possible by the design of the trap-
door one-way functions which are built into every public-key scheme. fhe sender must obtain the
recipient's encryption key from the public file to encrypt the message before sending it to the
recipient. Since the recipient is the only one who has the trap-door information which is the
decryption key, he is the only one who can decrypt the message.
In a conventional scheme, communication between n nodes requires as many as n2 secret keys.
On the other hand with the public-key schemes communication between n nodes requires only n
9secret keys. There is a difference of a factor of n in key distribution and key management between
public-key and conventional systems. Public-key schemes alleviate the need to manage n(n-1) keys
that would have to be used in the conventional scheme to only n keys.
Cryptography uses tranformations of the actual data to make the resulting data useless to one's
opponents. These transformations help solve the two major data security problems of privacy and
authentication. The privacy problem involves preventing opponents from extracting information from
the communication channel. The authentication problem involves preventing the opponents from
altering transmissions by adding incorrect data into the communication channel and thus changing the
messages.
For some public-key systems the encryption and decryption operations are interchangeable
and can be used for authentication. Let two users be user A and user 1. In public-key systems there
are two keys for each user. The encryption keys are EA and 03 and the decryption keys are )A and
D. Define DA(E(M))= M and D B(())=M. The decryption keys are secret, whereas the
encryption keys are public. The sender, user A, can encrypt or sign his message, M, first with DA to
produce )A(M). Then he encrypts the result with El to produce E()A(M)). Then the cryptogram
is transmitted to the receiver, user B. User B then decrypts the cryptogram first with D13 to produce
In(I(DA(M))), which is )A(M). User B decrypts the result with EA to produce EA(DA(M)), which
yields the desired message M. This process permits user B to authenticate the message sent by user
A, since only user A could have encrypted the message with DA. The message must be time
dependent, otherwise anyone could record El(DA(M)) and use it later as a signature for A.
The candidate cryptosystem for high-data rate (64 Kbits/sec-120 Mbits/sec) satellite
communications must be: 1) secure, and 2) relatively simple to implement. In addition the
cryptosystem must allow for relatively easy distribution and management of the keys. The desired
speed of cryptosystems for satellite communications is in the 1 to 10 Mbit/sec range. Public-key
cryptosystems will be the primary candidates for high-speed satellite communication applications
because of the relative ease of key distribution and key management for these cryptosystems. In the
past, many different public-key schemes have been developed. This dissertation discusses several
schemes of Rivest-Shamir-Adleman, Merkle and Hellman, Rabin, and Williams individually and
comes to a conclusion as to which of the schemes are compatible with the criteria set for high-speed
secure satellite communication. The possibility of using conventional schemes such as the recently
proposed Data Encryption Standard (DES) for satellite communications will also be discussed.
1.2 SCOPE OF THE DISSER TA TION
To aid in understanding of the dissertation organization, a brief summary of each chapter is
given here.
Chapter 1 introduces the problem area and gives the motivation for the studies undertaken.
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Chapter 2 summarizes the previous conventional schemes. The following five schemes will be
discussed: 1) the running key cipher; 2) the Hagelin machine; 3) rotor machines; 4) linear
feedback shift registers; and 5) IBM's Data Encryption Standard (DES). These conventional
schemes will be of interest when one studies public-key schemes. Also described is the main downfall
of all conventional schemes requiring that only one secret key be securely given to both users trying
to communicate. This leads to a study of public-key cryptosystems which alleviate this problem.
Chapter 3 discusses several of the existing public-key schemes including the public-key
schemes of: 1) Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) scheme; and the 2) Merkle and Hellman (knapsack
scheme). These two public-key schemes will be of interest when the Rabin scheme and Williams
scheme are analyzed and shown to have some advantages and disadvantages when compared to other
public-key schemes.
Chapter 4 describes the main public-key schemes to be discussed in depth in this dissertation.
It discusses: 1) the Rabin scheme; 2) how the decryption of the Rabin scheme is equivalent to
factoring r; 3) the Williams scheme and how it solves the ambiguity problem; and 4) how the
decryption of the Williams scheme is equivalent to factoring r.
The next three chapters will discuss inportant properties of the Rabin scheme which must first
be found in order to find its weaknesses. The properties lead to sone very interesting cryptanalysis
attacks on the Rabin scheme. Some of the properties are counterintuitive, while other properties are
very intuitive.
Chapter 5 discusses how many decryptions each possible cryptogram may have in the Rabin
scheme. The cases are: 1) one-decryption; 2) two-decryptions; and 3) four-decryption.
Chapter 6 describes the effects of choosing different b's on the Rabin scheme. The parameter
b has no real effect on the cryptograms except for a shift of the relative positions of the cryptograms
with respect to the messages. 'The number of four-solutions, two-solutions, and one-solution
cryptograms remains the same for different b's as do the relative positions of the four-solutions, two-
solutions, and one-solution cryptograms with respect to each other. Some of the subproperties are
counterintuitive, while other subproperties are very intuitive. The four major sub-properties are as
follows: 1) for b = 1, 2, 3, ... (r-1)/2 the scheme has the same cryptograms as for b = -1, -2, -3, ... (1-
r)/2, respectively, except the values of the cryptograms are shifted with respect to the values of the
messages; 2) as b varies the number of four-solutions, two-solutions, and one-solution cryptograms
remain the same. For any b not equal to 0 (mod p) or 0 (mod q) the number of cryptograms of the
form z=0 (mod p) or 0 (mod q) remain the same. Also, the pattern which relates cryptograms to
their respective numbers of solItions shifts with respect to the values of the messages; and 3) for
b=-k (mod p) or -j (mod q) or +k (mod p) or +j (mod q) there is a method to find a cryptogram
that equals 0 (mod p) or 0 (mod q). Therefore, the choice of b has no effect, and that the breaking
of the Rabin scheme for one b breaks the Rabin scheme for all b's.
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In the Rabin scheme, seven additional properties are of particular interest are discussed in
Chapter 7. These are: 1) cryptograms and messages of the form 0 (mod p) or 0 (mod q); 2) the
encryption function which maps r possible messages into only about r/4 possible cryptograms; 3)
m=z; 4) m=-b; 5) z-z 2= 0 (mod p) or 0 (mod q); 6) repeated encryption; and 7) the relative
speeds of the Rabin and the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman schemes.
Chapter 8 describes the ambiguity problem of the Rabin scheme. The ambiguity problem is
to decide which of the four-solution messages found in decryption is the original message. There are
several possible approaches to solve the problem by: 1) the simple parity check; 2) the choice of
largest solution; 3) the choice of a set of possible messages ; 4) coding; and 5) the usage of the
Williams scheme.
General attacks on the Rabin scheme are introduced in chapter 9 including how: 1) a
repeated encryption attack can always be launched; 2) the Pollard algorithm can be used for a
repeated encryption attack; 3) the equivalence of decryption to factoring enables a chosen ciphertext
attack; 4) the equivalence of decryption to factoring does not contribute to other attacks; 5) the
equivalence of decryption to factoring contributes to possible signature attacks; and 6) Rabin added
patches to protect his scheme from signature attacks. 'These potential attacks are all byproducts from
an investigation of Rabin scheme properties.
Chapter 10 describes general attacks on the Williams scheme, including how: 1) the
equivalence of decryption to factoring enables a chosen ciphertext attack; 2) the equivalence of
decryption to factoring does not contribute to possible signature attacks; 3) the equivalence of
decryption to factoring does not contribute to other attacks; 4) Williams added patches to protect
his scheme from chosen ciphertext and signature attacks; and 5) there is no repeated encryption
attack or Pollard's algorithm attack on the Williams scheme.
Chapter 11 describes conclusions and areas for future research.
Chapter 12 is the bibliography.
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2 PREVIOUS CONVENTIONAL SCHEMES
2.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses previous conventional schemes. Focusing on following five schemes:
1) the running key cipher; 2) the Hagelin machine; 3) rotor machines; 4) linear feedback shift
registers; and 5) IBM's Data Encryption Standard (DES).
These conventional schemes are of interest when one studies public-key schemes. Public-key
schemes were invented to alleviate some of the problems in existing conventional schemes. For a
more detailed description of conventional schemes consult either "Privacy and Authentication: An
Introduction to Cryptography" by Diffie and Hellman or "The Codebreakers" by Kahn.
2.2 OLD CONVENTIONAL SCHEMES
The old conventional schemes include: 1) the running key cipher: 2) the Iagelin machine;
3) rotor machines; and 4) linear feedback shift registers. These schemes contain weaknesses which
enabled the cryptanalysts to break them. The main problem with conventional schemes is that they
require one private key between each pair of users. However, only one private key needs to be used.
2.2.1 TH E RUNNING KEY CIPHE R
To encipher, the plaintext is added modulo 26 to the key which is a readily available book or
magazine. Spaces are deleted from the ciphertext to make the cryptanalysis harder. To decipher the
key is subtracted from the ciphertext.
The method for breaking this scheme makes use of probable words which occur in the
plaintext such as: of the, tion, who, what, etc.. The probable words are subtracted from the
ciphertext to find part of the key.
2.2.2 THE HA GELIN MACHINE
Used during World War II as a field cipher, the Hlagelin machine is similar to the running
key cipher in that a key of letters are added together with the message to encipher. The key stream is
the set of letters in the alphabet. The plaintext, P, is subtracted from the keystream, K (mod 26), so
the ciphertext C is its own inverse.
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C=K-P (mod 26) -+ P=K-C (mod 26)
Therefore the keystream generation is very important. The keystream is generated by a set of key
wheels generating a pseudorandom sequence of six bit groups, which are then translated into
characters by the cage. Prior to enciphering, the machine is keyed by adjusting the pin settings on
the wheel to produce the correct enciphering and deciphering. There are six keywheels with teeth
having the following number of teeth respectively: 26, 25, 23, 21, 19, and 17. Each tooth of every
wheel has a pin that can be extended or retracted and each bit of key determines the setting of each
pin. The wheels are set to inital positions before turning. The wheels are labeled with as many
letters of the alphabet possible for the number of teeth starting with a and ending with z with the
initial position of the wheels starting at aaaaaa. The six pins that are on the six teeth of the a's on
each wheel correspond to the first letter of the wheel. The wheels are rotated one position each until
bbbbbb is reached and from here the next set of pins are read to retrieve the next letter. This
continues until the first seventeen letters are read off the six wheels at qqqqqq. The next turn of the
wheel produces rrrrra and the pins are read again for the next letter. Since the numbers 26, 25, 23,
21, 19, and 17 are relatively prime, the number of possible characters is
(26x25x23x21x19x]7)= 101,000,000.
The cage functions as a PROM containing 26=64 letters, which are represented by the
numbers 0 to 25. The six bits read from the wheel serve as a memory address to the PROM, so
when the addre- is read to the PROM, the corresponding character is retrieved. The deciphering is
done by subtracting the ciphertext from the key stream, which is the reverse of enciphering.
2.2.3 ROTOR MA CHINES
Another device used in World War 11 was the rotor machine. Around the rotor there were
electrical contacts each of which represents some letter. Each rotor has a front face and a back face.
Each electrical contact on the front face is wired to one electrical contact on the back face, thereby
creating a permutation. An electrical signal for a character is permuted as it travels from the front to
the back of the rotor. If the rotor is rotated the permutation produced on an incoming signal will
change. Rotor operation can be shown by representing the rotor function as R, the permutation as P,
and the shift as C; so the permutation that is represented by the rotor is
P= CNRC-N
The shift of CN is a cyclic shift through N positions of the rotor. Therefore, if R(F)=M, then
C4R(F)=Q and C4RC-(F)-C 4R(B)-C 4(l)=M.
Rotors can be interconnected so that after a character leavesone rotor it enters another rotor
at a different location. The additional permutations in a set of rotors make the system more complex.
This is shown in the following:
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ClR1C IC 2 R2C 2 ... Cm'RCm=ClRC 2  .R R 1) cm(m-1)I; m
This arrangement of rotors can implement a very large variety of permutations since each
rotor can be rotated to different positions. '[he rotation of the rotors is used to change the
permutations instead of a change of the connector positions, because it is much harder to change
electical connections than to rotate the rotors. As each character is enciphered it is necessary to rotate
the rotor to ensure a strong cryptographic system, consequently the motion of the rotor is important
and must be carefully chosen. The simplest method of rotation is a odometer motion. The rightmost
wheel rotates after each encipherment, until the wheel has completed one rotation. Then the wheel to
the left advances once while the rightmost wheel continues to rotate. Desirable characteristics for
motion of the rotors include: 1) the period must be long enough so that the key cannot be
remembered; 2) each state change should be large, so that as many of the rotors rotate as much as
possible relative to each other. Therefore, very few of the exponents CN1-N 2 are zero. These
characteristics are not easy to accomplish.
The longest possible motion is that of the odometer consisting of 266~_309 million different
states; however, each state change does not effect most of the rotors. Therefore, something similar to
the Hagelin machine rotation may be desirable. For this method each wheel does not rotate to all of
its possible positions; it skips a few selected positions Qo that it can simulate the Hagelin machine's
rotation. The first wheel rotates to all of the 26 contacts, the second wheel to 25 contacts, the third
wheel to 23 contacts, the fourth wheel to 21 contacts, the fifth wheel to 19 contacts and the last wheel
to 17 contacts. Then all of the wheels can rotate at once like the Hagelin machine. This rotation
satisfies objective 2) while still giving a reasonable number of possible states, 101 million, which can
satisfy characteristic 1).
The rotor machine is keyed by changing positions of the rotors, the order of the rotors, the
number of stopping places per wheel (the number of stops must not have common factors with each
other to maintain a maximum number of states), the pattern of motion, or by choosing different
rotors out of a basket.
2.2.4 LINEAR FEEDBACK SHIFT REGISTERS
Since the one-time cipher has been shown to be completely secure, one may try to simulate it
using large linear feedback shift registers to produce pseudorandom key strings to XOR with the
message. h'lie initial settings of the shift register can be thought of as the key. Figure 2.2.4 shows a
possible implementation of a shift register.
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A THREE STAGE SHIFT REGISTER
FIGUR E 2.2.4
The figure above illustrates a three stage shift register. The first and second stages are added
(mod 2) to form the next input to the shift register. The key is the initial inputs stored in the shift
register. If the key is chosen to be 001 and the shift register is started, then the sequence of states
after the initial key state are shown in figure 2.2.4. The shift register goes through seven non-zero
states before returning to the key state, where the eighth possible state is never reached because it
loops around itself. The period of seven is the largest possible number of states for a three stage shift
register. In general, if there are x stages then there are 2x-1 number of possible states in a loop.
In the figure, the plaintext is added (mod 2) to the third stage bits of the shift register to
produce the ciphertext. Since the modulo two addition is self-inverse, the decryption is done in the
same manner. The length of the loop or the period is dependent on the shift register taps. If taps
were on all the stages instead of just the first and third stages, the maximum length of the loop would
be four instead of seven. This system is not secure although it is meant to imitate a secure system.
2.3 COMMENTS ON OLD CONVENTIONAL SCHEMES
The above four schemes have been broken, either probabilistically or by other means. '[he
main problem is the distribution of the keys, especially with conventional cryptographic schemes.
This includes the recently proposed Data Encryption Standard. For the receiver and the sender to
securely communicate the key, they must use a secure channel such as registered mail and set a time
- i 1
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to have cryptographic communications. The registered mail will take time and therefore key
distribution has been a major problem in the use of cryptography. This key distribution problem is
more pronounced in large scale networks, where the number of possible connections and keys grows
on the order of n(n-1)/2 for n users. A system with a million users has almost 500 billion possible
connections and the cost of key distribution can become too large to be done effectively.
2.4DATA ENCRYPTION STANDARD (DES)
The DES is shown in figure 2.4.1. Based on S boxes, the 64 bit plaintext is first put through
an initial permutation, and then the plaintext block is split into two sub-blocks. These 32 bit long
sub-blocks are R0 and 1.0. The algorithm then switches the sub-blocks from left to right with the
addition of a function on the right block, R, and the key block, K, for a total of 16 rounds.
L(i)=R(i-1) and
R(i)= L(i-l)eF(R(i-1),K(i)) (mod 2)
The G operation is a modulo two addition, K(i) is a 48 bit section of key that is used in the i-th
round, and F is a function with a 32 bit output.
The function F need not be invertible to decrypt since L(i-l), and R(i-1) can be computed
from L(i) and R(i) as follows:
R(i-1)= L(i) and
L_.(i-1)= R(i)EF(L(i),K(i)) (mod 2)
This works even if the function F(R,K) is an n-to-one mapping.
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FIGURE 2.4.1
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FIGURE 2.4.2
The algorithm for the function F is shown in figure 2.4.2. The S boxes are non-linear and
will be the source of the security for DES. All the other operations are linear and can be
cryptanalyzed. In function F, the 32 bit R is first expanded to 48 bits in R'. The extra sixteen bits
are duplicated bits of the first 32 bits of R, (1, 4, 5, 8, 9, 12, ... , 24, 27, 28, and 32). These are the
bits on the outside of each of the six bits that go into each of the S boxes. In other words, the first
four bits of R go into the first S box along with bit 32 and bit 5. This process continues for all the S
boxes. The repeated bits are added on cyclically to each four bit byte to make a six bit byte. If R is
represented by rl, r2, r3, ... r32, then R' is represented by r32, rl, r2, r3, r4, r5, r4, r5, r6, r7, r8, r9,
r8, r9, rIO, rl, r12, r13, . r28, r29, r30, r31, r32, rl. After this is done, the 48 bit R' and part of
the key, K, are added modulo two. They are then separated into six bit bytes input to each of the
eight S boxes. The S boxes are non-linear because they input six bits but output four bits. Thus,
there are 32 bits of output from the S boxes.
Since eight bits of the key are used for parity, the key has essentially 56 bits. From these,
there must be 16 sets of 48 bit key for the sixteen rounds or sixteen sets of keys, kl through k16
containing a total of 768 key bits. 'the key scheduling can be accomplished by using two 28 bit shift
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registers with 24 taps each. These 48 taps provide the 48 bits of key used for each of the 16 rounds.
After each round is encrypted, the shift register is shifted left to produce the next set of 48 bits of
key. Since all of the operations in DES are linear except for the S boxes, there is still the criterion
that the operation of encryption not be affine. If the S boxes are affine, then the whole operation of
encryption is affine and would be of the following form:
C=APeBKEDI (mod 2)
where A, B, and D would be fixed, K is the 56 bit key, and C is the ciphertext. The knowledge of
only one plaintext ciphertext pair would then allow the cryptanalyst to compute the key as follows:
K=(C-AP1-D)1/B (mod 2)
The decryption algorithm for the ciphertext is the same algorithm used for the encryption of
the plaintext, except the key scheduling algorithm is run in reverse.
2.5 COMMENTS ON THE DA TA ENCR YPTION STANDARD (DES)
Diffie, Hellman, Merkle, Schroeppel, Washington, Pohlig, and Schweitzer made an attempt to
cryptanalyze DES in August 1976. They found that the DES S boxes were not affine and discovered
other structures, present in the DES algorithm, some of which strengthened, while others weakened
the I)ES algorithm.
The positive structure found was this: each one bit change in input to the S boxes resulted in
two bits of change in the output. This structure creates a large set of changes, even if only one bit of
plaintext or key is changed. Therefore, the error propagation is large. This is good because it will
hurt the cryptanalyst who tries a cluster analysis attack. In addition the permutation P and expansion
E make the four outputs from any S box seemingly look like outputs from six different S boxes. This
enhances error propagation and hinders the chances of cluster analysis.
The negative structure found was a deep symmetry in DES under complementation which
halved the search effort under a chosen plaintext attack. If Sk denotes the enciphering using DES, k
denotes the key, and P denotes the plaintext, and P denotes the plaintext, then:
C =Sk(P)-+Sk'(P')
where C', k', and P1' are the complements of C, k, and P respectively. This symmetry, and the fact
that
F(F,k)=F(ERE k) (mod 2)--3F(R,k)=F(R',k')
brings the conclusion that F is invariant under complementation of R and k, where ER is the
20
expanded version of R.
This structure makes cryptanalysis quicker than a trial and error search for the key. Let P
encipher to C and P' encipher to C'. If P, P' and C, C' are known (or can be found using a chosen
plaintext attack), then enciphering P to C" under all possible keys with the least significant bit zero,
one knows that if C" is not equal to C, then k is not the correct key. If C" is not equal to C', then k'
is not the correct key as well. Since two keys can be tried for each encryption instead of only one the
speed of attack is doubled.
DES is fast enough for high speed satellite communications, but the key distribution and key
management problems, may be too great for large scale communication networks. Therefore, the
choice of DES does not have the desirable properties that a public-key cryptosysteml has. Public-key
cryptosystems alleviate some of the problems in the key distribution and key management. The
combined use of public-key schemes for key distribution and DlES for encryption/decryption
alleviates the problem of key distribution.
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3 PUBLIC-KEY SCHEMES
3.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses several of the existing public-key schemes including the public-key
schemes of: 1) Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA); and 2) Merkle and Hellman (knapsack scheme).
These two public-key schemes will be of interest when the Rabin scheme and Williams scheme are
analyzed and shown to have some advantages and disadvantages when compared to other public-key
schemes.
3.2 PUBLIC-KEY
Diffie and Hellman and, independently Merkle suggested a method to communicate securely
without a secure key distribution channel. This method is called public-key and was invented to
alleviate some of the problems in key distribution and key management discussed in chapter two. A
normal conventional scheme for privacy and authentication, along with a public-key scheme, are
represented in figures 3.2.1 to 3.2.3.
KEY
THE FLOW OF INFORMATION IN A CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIVACY SYSTEM
FIGURE 3.2.1
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KEY
THE FLOW OF INFORMATION IN A CRYPTOGRAPHIC AUTHENTICATION SYSTEM
FIGURE 3.2.2
P'
THE FLOW OF INFORMATION IN A PUBLIC-KEY SYSTEM
FIGURE 3.2.3
Two problems with conventional schemes are privacy and authentication, as shown in figure
3.2.1 and figure 3.2.2. The privacy problem is to prevent an opponent from extracting information
from a communication channel whereas the authentication problem is to prevent an opponent from
injecting false data into the channel or altering the messages. Therefore, there is a need to securely
transfer the key to the sender and the receiver. In the public-key scheme the secure key transfer link
can be eliminated and only n secret keys need be used instead of as many as n2. This alleviates the
key management and key distribution problems.
In figure 3.2.3 the public-key system shows that communication between the transmitter and
receiver can be accomplished while allowing an eavesdropper to listen to the communications. Since
the keys are never transmitted, the eavesdropper cannot steal the key by listening. In public-key
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cryptosystems there are separate keys for encryption and decryption. Keys must be protected in
conventional schemes, because enciphering and deciphering require the same key, and the two
functions are separated. Public-key systems separate the encryption and decryption functions and use
two keys one for encryption and the other for decryption. Therefore, the encryption key does not
have to be secret.
Public-key cryptosystems consist of separate encryption and decryption functions that are
invertible and dependent on the key. The functions encrypt a message, m, to a cryptogram, c, and
decrypt a cryptogram, c, to a message, m. The following properties exist in public-key systems: 1)
for every key the decryption function, D, has an inverse, E, such that for any key, k, and any
message, m, one has D(F(m))=m; 2) for every key and message the values of E(m) and D(c) are
easy to compute; 3) for almost any key, any easily computed algorithm that is equivalent to 1) is
computationally unfeasible to derive from E; and 4) for every key, it is feasible to generate the
inverse pair, E and ), from the key.
The first property insures that the encryption algorithm has an inverse. The second property
insures that the encryption and decryption algorithms are easy to apply. The third property insures
that F can be made public without a loss of security on ), while the fourth property insures that
once the key is known, there must be a method to compute E or ) in a reasonable amount of time.
The system alleviates the key distribution problem, since each user can generate E and ), and then
make E public. Anyone can encrypt messages to the us:sr, but no one else can decrypt the messages
sent to him.
The authentication problem in conventional schemes is illustrated in figure 3.2.2. The figure
shows how a conventional scheme can provide a method to prevent an eavesdropper from inserting
false undetected messages into the system, although it does not provide a method to determine if
messages are ever sent. The problem exists between the sender and the receiver, when the receiver
says that a certain message was sent, but the sender denies this. The problem arises because the
sender and receiver have the same keys.
Digital signatures can be used to alleviate the authentication problem. In extended public-key
systems the authentication problem can be solved by the use of digital signatures. Fxtended public-
key systems have the following property added: 5) for every key, E is the inverse of 1) so that for
any k and any m, E(l)(m))=m. The following method of digital signatures is described below. If
user A sends a signed message to user B, he first calculates S=DA(m) which he uses as a signature,
then user B calculates EA(S)=m to retrieve the message. User B can save S as proof that user A sent
the particular message to him, since only A could have produced S. (Only A has DA). User A can
be held responsible for producing signature S. This method of digital signatures provides an
unforgeable message-dependent signature.
To include privacy into the extended public-key system, user A can calculate E'(S)=c and
send this cryptogram to B. Since only B has DB, he is the only one that can decrypt c with DB to
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retrieve D(c)=S and can save S as proof that user A sent the message, m, to him. To prevent B
from saying A sent the message more than once, user A can make the message time-dependent.
Public-key cryptosystems can alleviate some of the problems in key distribution and key
management. In addition if property five is included in the public-key cryptosystems, it can provide
digital signatures for solving the authentication problem.
3.3 RIVEST-SHAMIR-A DLEMAN SCHEME (RSA)
This scheme makes use of discrete exponentiations for its encryption and decryption with the
assumption that factoring a number, the product of two large primes, is conputationally unfeasible.
Given two users, A and B, who wish to communicate with each other, A chooses two very large
primes, p and q, and multiplies them together to get r. A then calculates <P(r)=(p-1)(q-l) using p
and q, and chooses another number, EA, such that (P$(r),EA)=1 and lm^<((r)-1, where (X, Y) is the
g.c.d of X and Y. User A calls EA his encryption function and puts LA and r into a public file to be
used by other users to encrypt messages to him. Typically encryption is done in blocks of 400-500
bits. Each block is encrypted by raising the message block, M, to the EA power modulo r as follows:
A
C=ME (mod r)
where C is the cryptogram block that represents the encrypted message block, M. In modular
arithmetic calculations in the exponents is done modulo 0(r). User A can calculate DA by simply
calculating the inverse of EA modulo 5(r). (Since EA is relatively prime to D(r), this inverse can be
found). Once this is accomplished, A can decrypt his message using DA as follows:
A A A
M=CDA =(ME )D (mod r)
Where EA is the inverse of DA modulo 4(r).
3.4 COMMENTS ON THE RSA SCHEME
The RSA scheme is a very ingenious, but because of the exponentiation it is slow in
comparison to conventional schemes such as DES. Presently the highest-speed implementation of the
RSA scheme is only in the Kbit/sec range, whereas satellite communications require rates in the 1 to
10 Mbit/sec range. If the speed of the Rivest scheme could be increased in encryption or decryption,
it would be a very viable scheme for satellite communications. With present limitations the RSA
scheme can be used for public-key distribution.
Studies by Simmons and Norris have developed an attack on the RSA scheme by repeated
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encryption of the cryptogram. This method has been rendered ineffectual by Rivest, choosing primes
such that <b(p) and <b(q) have very large prime factors themselves.
Other studies, by Tore Herlestam, have developed an attack on the RSA scheme by taking the
cryptogram to some power that is a polynomial in E. If p=2p'+1 and q=2q'+1, a choice Rivest
stated to be secure against the Simmons and Norris attack, then the Herlestam method is supposedly
able to attack the RSA scheme. Herlestam has relied heavily on fixed points to attack the RSA
scheme. His method is as follows:
For a=1, 2, ... m and for n=1, 2, ..., calculate:
(n~a) n
,(cn)C ) (mod r) (1)
and
,,n Fa(c I)(CE) (mod r) (2)
If (1) or (2) is c for any a then
(n + a-1) ,(n-1)
m=(c )(cl ) (mod r) if (1) is true or
(n-1) (a-1)
m=(c )(cE ) (mod r) if (2) is true.
It relies heavily on the following:
(E(n+a))(En)=I (mod p') and (E")(Ea)=1 (mod q')
This method appears to be very similar to the Simmons and Norris attack and is just a
generalization of that attack. If n and a are always small, then the attack may be viable, although
Herlestam gives no analytic proof of this. If a and n are large, then this attack is not feasible.
3.5 MERKLE AND HELLMAN SCHEME (KNAPSACK SCHEME
The Knapsack scheme is based on the well known np-complete knapsack problem. The
knapsack problem deals with a vector B=(b1 , b2, ... , b) of integers and some large integer Q. The
problem is to find the vector C=(ct, c2, ... , c) such that the dot product B'C is Q, which has been
shown to be np-complete. The knapsack problem can be used in a public-key cryptosystem by
simply dividing up the message M into n bit blocks and forming the bit vector M =(m, m2' -. , m).
The dot product of M and 1 equals Q, and the knapsack problem is to recover the message M from
Q. This is computationally unfeasible if B and M are randomly chosen. However, if 13 is chosen so
that each element is larger than the sum of the preceeding elements, solving the knapsack problem is
simple. Let B' be such a vector in which each element is larger than the sum of the preceeding
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elements. Choose an integer, V, such that V is greater than the sum of all the elements in B', and
choose U so that (U, V)= 1. Given two users, A and B, user A forms the vector:
B=UB' (mod V)
With vector B in the public file, user B can communicate with A, by forming the dot product:
Q=B'M
User B then sends this, and user A can decrypt it by finding the inverse of U (mod V), i.e., U' such
that
UU'=1 (mod V)
User A can decrypt the message by multiplying Q by U'. This leads to the solvable knapsack
problem in which all the elements of B' are greater than the sum of the preceeding elements. The
following demonstates the scheme analytically:
Q'=U'Q U' bimi=U'( Ub'j (mod V))mj=( U'Ub'j (mod V))mi
=( b'j (mod V))ni=B''M (mod V)
where V is greater than the sum of all the b's. Thenceforth, it is easy to compute the values for the
vector M, since all the elements of B' are greater than the sum of the preceding elements.
3.6 COMMENTS ON THE KNAPSA CK SCHEME
The knapsack scheme has a large bandwidth expansion caused by division of the message into
bit vectors multiplied by the B' vector. Since some of the integers in B' are very large, the dot
product of B' and M is also large. Therefore, even small messages require a very large number Q' in
order to be sent, and although this scheme is faster than the RSA scheme, it is hindered by the
bandwidth expansion.
Tore Herlestam has proposed a method to break the knapsack scheme, which involves the
choice of a prime p, greater than the integers of the vector B, and an index i so that l<i<n. ie
then computes a W such that Wbi=1 (mod p) and lets B'=WB (mod p) and Q'=WQ (mod p). If
b'n > b'1 + b'2 + ... b'(, 1. and Q' + p > b'1 + b'2 + ... b', then mn can easily be determined.
The value of mn will be one, if Q' is greater than b', or zero, if Q' is less than b'n. Then the
knapsack problem can be reduced to the remaining elements of the B' and M vectors and whatever is
left of A' after b' nim is subtracted from it. Therefore, the reduced knapsack problem is as follows:
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Q - b'nmn=b'im1  + b'22 + ... + b'(nl_)m(n-l)'
This reduced knapsack problem can be solved by successively choosing new p's until one is
found which follows the criteria. However, for large vectors this method is computationally infeasible.
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4 THE RABIN SCHEME AND WILLIAMS SCHEME
4.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses: 1) the Rabin scheme; 2) how the decryption of the Rabin scheme is
equivalent to factoring r; 3) the Williams scheme and how it solves the ambiguity problem; and 4)
how the decryption of the Williams scheme is equivalent to factoring r. The structure of the proofs
for the theorems and lemmas are due to Rabin and Williams.
4.2 THE RA BIN SCHEME
This newly proposed scheme is similar to the Rivest scheme and deals with two very large
primes, p and q, where p and q must be of the form 4k+1 or 4k-1. The primes p and q are
multiplied together to get r. A user, A, chooses the primes p and q and a constant b and places b
and r into a public file. The message, in encrypts to the cryptogram, z. The encryption is as follows:
z=m(m+b) (mod r)
The deciyption is a bit more difficult, since the receiver must solve the following equation for
m:
z--m2+b*m (mnod r).
Let
xi=z (mod p) and
x2=z (mod q),
then user A must solve the following:
m 2 +m*b-x 1 =O (mod p) and
m 2 +m*b-x 2 =0 (mod q).
These equations can be solved using the quadratic formula so that:
mi= (-b + (b4*x) (mod p)
2
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2=(-b- (b *) (mod p)
2
m3 =_(-b_+ (24x2) (mod q)
2
m4=(-b- (b2-42) (mod q).
2
Once the square root is calculated, user A finds four solutions, mi, mf2, 13, and m4 and using
the Chinese remainder theorem the four solutions to the cryptogram z can be found. The four
solutions cause an ambigtuity probleim, since the receiver can not easily determine the original
message from the four solutions. To take square roots user A must solve
y2-m=0 (mod p) (1).
Assume first that p=4k-1 so that 41p+1. Since m is a quadratic residue, then
rn((p-1)/ 2)=1 (mod p).
One of the square roots can be written as
j= V' 7 = m((p [1)/4) (mod p).
Then,
j2=m(p+1/2)m(n((p-1)/ 2))=m (mod p).
If p=4k+1, user A can solve equation (1) directly using a probabilistic algorithm.
4.3 HOW THE DECRYPTION OF THE RABIN SCHEME IS EQUIVALENT TO
FA CTORING THE MODULUS
The structure of the following proof is due to Rabin and can be found in "Digitalized
Signatures and Public-Key Functions as Intractable as Factorization". The Rabin scheme encryption
algorithm is
( *).z = m(m + b) (mod r)
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By a substitution of variables this
b=2*d (mod r). Substituting into (*),
can be reduced to y2 = n (mod r), where n=z+d 2 and
one gets the following:
m2 +2*d*m+d 2 = (m+d)2 = n (mod r).
where, clearly y=(m+d) (mod r). Now to
proves the following theorem.
prove the equivalence of decryption to factorization, one
THEOREM: Let AL be an algorithm for finding one of the solutions of
y2 - n (mod r) (***)
whenever a solution exists. Suppose F(r) steps are required. Then there is an algorithm for factoring
r requiring 2F(r)+2*log2 r steps.
PROOF: Assume that r=p*q is a product of two large primes. Then for any k in the range
O<k<r and (k,r)=1, there are exactly four-solutions to the equation:
y2 = k2 (mod r) ( **)
Letting t=k (mod p) and s=k (mod q), the four-solutions by the Chinese remainder theorem
are ±t (mod p) and ±s (mod q). Each of the four numbers mod r is a solution. Now for any u and
v such that 0< u, v < r and u2 =v 2 (mod r), solutions to (**) can be divided into classes containing
four-solutions for (y,r)=1; two-solutions for (y,r)=p or q; and one-solution for (y,r)=r.
Since AL just performs a square root function, let n /2 be the solution of the equation (***)
for any n with (n,r)=1.
Now choose a random number k such that 0(k<r. If (k,r)#1, then one can immediately get a
factor because (k,r)=p or q. On the other hand if (k,r)= 1, which is normally the case, one can still
factor r.
Using AL to find one-solution, k1 =n1 . The solutions occur in classes, so by choosing a
random number k, all the solutions in that class have an equal probability of being chosen. Now for
(y,r) = 1 there are four-solutions per class, so there is equal probability of 1/4 for each of the following:
k=k
k =Al
k-ki
k=-ki
(mod
(mod
(mod
(mod
and
and
and
and
k=k
k=k
k =-kl
(mod
(mod
(mod
(mod
q) o
q)
q)
q).
r
or
or
So that with probability of one has:
k=k1 (mod p), and k=-kl (mod q) or
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k=-kl (mod p), and k=kl (mod q).
Thus one has with probability that
(k-k n) = p or q.
The computation of n /2 requires F(r) steps, while the computation of the g.c.d requires at
most log2r subtractions and divisions by 2, of numbers smaller than n. Thus the expected number of
steps to factor r, given AL, is 2*F(r)+2*log 2r. QED.
This proof can easily be extended to the general case.
4.4 T HE WILLIAMS SCHEME AND HO VIT SOLVES THE AMBIGUITY
OF THE RA BIN SCHEME
The Williams scheme solves the ambiguity problem of the Rabin scheme. The encryption and
decryption functions are different from those of the Rabin scheme and consists of two encryption
functions El and E2 along with two decryption functions D1 and D2
In the Williams scheme there are two large prime numbers, p and q, whose product is the
modulus r= p*q and for reasons to be seen later the preimes have a special form. Prime p is
congruent to 3 (mod 8) and q is congruent to 7 (mod 8). The first encryption function is as follows:
Let m be a message in Al subject to the following restrictions:
(2(2*m+l)) < r if (2*m+1 | r) = -1 or
(4(2*m+1)) < r if (2*m+1 | r) = 1.
The first part of the encryption process is as follows:
n=EL(m)=t(2(2*m+1)) if (2*m+1 I r) = -1
{(4(2*m+1)) if (2*m+1 I r) = 1.
The second encryption function, E2 depends on an exponent e having the property that (e,
X(r))=1, where X(r)= lcm(p-1,q-1). Since we want the smallest quantity x such that mX = 1 (mod
r), X(r) can be used instead of <b(r). One then calculates d such that e*d=(((p-1)*(q-l)/4-1)/2) (mod
X(r)) and uses the encryption:
g=E2(n)=n' (mod r).
The encrypted message is sent, whereupon the receiver takes the cryptogram g and decrypts it
using the two decryption functions. The first is as follows:
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h = ) 2(g) = g2 d (mod r).
Now the receiver can decode the reduced cryptogram h with the following rule to make h
even:
h={h if h is even
jr-h if h is odd.
Then use the following rule to compute m:
m={((h/4 - 1)/2) if h=0 (mod 4)
{((h/2 - 1)/2) if h=2 (mod 4).
To show that this is a valid encryption and decryption scheme, one must show that
)(D2(2(E(m)))) = m (mod r). Since n - E(m), n must be even, O<n<r, and (nir) = 1.
h = )2(E 2(n)) = 1 2ed -. 1 ((p-1)(q-1)/4+1)-.
This last equality is true because of the lemma: If r=p*q, and p, q are such that p = q = -l
(mod 4), and (mjr) = 1, then,
m(p-1)(q-)/4 = ±1 (mod r).
Since (nlp*q), (mjp)=(mlq), so there are two cases:
If (mlp)=(mlq)=1 implies that
m(p-1)/ 2 =1 (mod p) - m (p)(qt')/4 =1 (mod p), and
in(q-l)/2= 1 (mod q) +m(p-1)(q-1)/4=1 (mod q)
then m(p-1)(q-1)/ 4 =1 (mod r).
Conversely if (mip)=(inq)=-1 implies that
I(p-])/2=-1 (mod p) --+ m =-1 (mod p), and
m =-I (mod q) - (q-lXp-l)/4 -1 (mod q)
then m(p-1)(q-l)/4 =-1 (mod r).
The first two implications are true because (p-1)/2 and (q-1)/2 are odd, so that -1 to an odd
power is still -1.
Therefore, if h is even, then h=n; if h is odd, then h=-n or h=r-n. If h=0 (mod 4), then
the encryption was of the form 4(2m+1), and the decryption will be m = (h/4-1)/2. Conversely, if
h=2 (mod r), then the encryption was of the form 2(2m+1), and the decryption will be m = (h/2-
1)/2. The cases where h =1 (mod 4) are the same as h = 0 (mod 4), once h is replaced by r-h. The
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cases where h =3 (mod 4) are the same as h =2 (mod 4), once h is replaced by r-h.
4.5 HOW THE DECRYPTION OF THE WILLIAMS SCHEME IS
EQUIVA LENT TO FACTORING THE MODULUS
This section will discuss the equivalence of the decryption in the Williams scheme to the
factoring of r. The structure of the proof is due to Williams and can be found in "A Modification of
the RSA Public-Key Encryption Procedure". This proof follows from a set of lemmas which depend
on the fact that r=p*q.
LEMMA 1: If one selects any integer x such that (xlr) = -1, then there exists some integer
y such that 0 < y 5 (log2 r)/2 and some message m E A such that E(m) = k, where k = 2-4y, X2
(mod r).
LEMMA 2: r=p*q and p=q=-1 (mod 4), so for any given integer x there exists an integer
y such that y2 = x2 (mod r) and (ylr)=-(xlr). (This is essentially the four-decryption case with the
solutions ±x (mod p) and ±x (mod q) to be detailed later).
PROOF OF LEMMA 2: Let y=-x (mod p) and y=x (mod q). Then y2 =x 2 (mod p*q) and
therefore
(ylr)=(ylp)(ylq)=(-xlp)(xlq)=-(xjr). QED.
PROOF OF LEMMA 1: Now from lemma 2 there exists somfe y such that x2 = y2 (mod r)
such that (ylr)= -(xlr)=1. Let n* be the solution of
ze =y (mod r) (note this implies z2e=y 2 =x 2 (mod r))
such that 0(n*<r. Then to make n* even, define n' to be
n'={n* if n* is even
{r-n* if n* is odd.
Next factor all the 4's out of n' so that n'= 22, where 21n and 8 does not divide n. Taking
the logs of both sides one obtains
2ylog2n = log 2r
0<2Y(log 2r
0<y<log2r/2.
We have (n'|r)=(yjr)=1, because n'C=y (mod r), so (n'Ir)C=(ylr). Since (e,lcm[p-1,q-1])=1
and lcm[p-1,q-1]=2, e must not be even . If e is odd the only way to have (n'jr)=(yjr)=1 is to have
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(n'r) =1.
The value of (21r) is always -1, because (2|p)=1 and (21q)=-I. The equality n'=227n
implies that (n'Ir)=(2|r) 2y(njr). The value of (21r) 2y must be 1 because -1 raised to an even power is
1. This implies that (21r) 2 y(nlr)=(nir)=(n'jr)=1 and finally (nir)=(n'Ir)=(yjr)=1.
If this is the case, there must exist some m E Al such that El(m)=n. Since (nlr)=1 and 21n
or even 41n, one can use D1(n) to find an m that satisfies the values of n. Also, one has
E2(n)=n 2e=(2-2Yn') 2e=2-4ye x 2 (mod r).
Letting k=2-4ye x2 (mod r) (O<k<r), it is easily seen that E(m)=k. QED.
LEMMA 3: If p= 7 (mod 8) and q=3 (mod 8), with r=p*q and (xlr)=-1, then there exists
an integer z such that x -±2z 2 (mod r).
PROOF OF LEMMA 3:
Once again there are two cases in the proof.
CASE 1: If (xlp)=1 and (xlq)=-1, then there must exist an integer z, such that x=2z 2
(mod p). This is true because 2 is a quadratic residue for p=8k+7 and x/2 is also a quadratic
residue; thus, z, is the square root of x/2. This square root is guaranteed to exist since x/2 is a
quadratic residue. The value of x/2 must be a quadratic residue since x and 2 are both quadratic
residues. In addition there must exist an integer z2 such that x=2z22 (mod q). This is true because
2 is a non-quadratic residue for q=8k+3 and x/2 is a quadratic residue; thus, z2 is the square root
of x/2. '[his square root is guaranteed, since x/2 is a quadratic residue. The value of x/2 must be a
quadratic residue, since x and 2 are both quadratic non-residues. QED.
CASE 2: If (xlp)=-1 and (xlq)=t, then there must exist an integer z, such that x=-2zi2
(mod p). This is true because -2 is a quadratic non-residuc for p=8k+7 and -x/2 is a quadratic
residue; thus, zi is the square root of x/2. This square root is guaranteed to exist since -x/2 is a
quadratic residue. The value of -x/2 must be a quadratic residue since x and -2 are both quadratic
non-residues. In addition, there must exist an integer z2 such that x=-2z22 (mod q). This is true
because -2 is a quadratic residue for q=8k +3 and -x/2 is a quadratic residue; thus, z2 is the square
root of -x/2. This square root is guaranteed, since -x/2 is a quadratic residue. The value of -x/2
must be a quadratic residue, since x and -2 are both quadratic residues. QED.
LEMMA 4; If (ylr)=1 and (xlr)=-l and r=p*q, then (y-x,r)=p or q.
PROOF OF LEMMA 4:
In this lemma there are again different cases in the proof.
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CASE 1; If (ylp)=(ylq)=1 and (xlp)=1 and (xlq)=-1, then
(xlp)=(yjp)-+
x=y (mod p)-+
x=y + np
x-y=np or more simply pi(x-y).
In order to show (x-y,r)=p or q and not r, it must be ascertained that ql(x-y) is not true.
Assume that it is true. We have,
x-y=nq,
then x = y (mod q)
and (xlq)=(yjq)
which is a contradiction. Therefore ql(x-y) is not true and only pI(x-y), which means (x-y,r)=p.
QED.
CASE 2; If (ylp)=(ylq)=1 and (xlp)=-1 and (xlq)=l, reverse the roles of p and q. This
reverts back to case 1. QED.
CASE 3; If (ylp)=(yjq)=-1 and (xjq)= 1 and (xlp)=-1, then this is the same as case 1.
QED.
CASE 4; If (ylp)=(ylq)=-1 and (xlq)=-1 and (xlp)=1, then this is the same as case 2.
QED.
Now by letting K= {KIK=E(m), m E A}., this leads to the equivalence theorem.
THEOREM OF EQUIVA LENCE; If for any K = E(m) E K there exists an algorithm F such
that F can be applied to find m, then F can also be used to factor r.
PROOF OF EQUIVALENCE; Choose any x such that (xlr)=-1. Then all such values of x
are characterized by lemma 3. By lemma 1 there must exist some y such that 0y<log2r/2 and some
in E A! such that,
E(m)= K,
where K=(2-2yex) 2 (mod r). Since K E K, one can use F to find m. By letting y=El(m)
(mod r), one then has
y K=-(2-2Yex)2 (mod r).
Then since (ylr)=1, one has (2-2yexlr)=-1. By lemma 4
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(y-2-2yex,r)=p or q,
but, since (2-2yer)=1, one can state that
(22yey-x,r)=p or q. QED.
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5 CRYPTOGRAMS WITH MULTIPLE SOLUTIONS IN THE RABIN
SCHEME
5.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses how many decryptions each possible cryptogram may have in the Rabin
scheme. The cases are: 1) one-decryption; 2) two-decryptions; and 3) four-decryptions. Additional
properties will be discussed in the next two chapters. The properties lead to several very interesting
cryptanalytic attacks on the Rabin scheme, some of which are counterintuitive, while other properties
are very intuitive.
5.2 NUMBER OF DECR YPTIONS
Rabin stated that decryption under the Rabin scheme yields four solutions. In fact a
cryptogram has either four solutions, two solutions, one solution, or no solution. 'This leads to many
algorithms for potential attacks on the Rabin scheme. However, these attacks have a low probability
of success. '['he existence of multiple solutions makes the decrypting difficult. In this section we
discuss the number of solutions for any particular cryptogram and the reasons for the different
possibilities.
Rabin's decryption algorithm begins by evaluating the cryptogram, z, modulo p and q,
obtaining:
x1=z (mod p) and
x2 =z (mod q).
The quadratic formula for solving quadratic equations can be used on each of the x's to find
m s.t. m(m+b)=z (mod p). There are two solutions from the quadratic formulas for each of the xi
and x2. Four-solutions messages can be found by combining the two solutions for xi and the two
solutions for x2 using the Chinese remainder theorem. This is only true if the discriminant of each of
the quadratic formulas is non-zero. If the discriminant of the quadratic formula is zero for only one
of the x's, then there will be only one solution for that particular x and two solutions for the other x.
Two-solutions messages can be found by combining the one solution for one of the x's with the two
solutions for the other x using the Chinese remainder theorem. Finally, if the discriminant is zero for
both xL and x2, then the quadratic formula will yield only one solution for x, and one solution for x2.
One-solution message can be found by combining the one solution for xi and the one solution for x2
using the Chinese remainder theorem. This one-solution message is the original message.
Unfortunately, there is no apparent method to determine how many solutions a cryptogram has a
priori. The analytic discussion is as follows:
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Encoding:
Let z=m(m+b) (mod r), r= p*q
Decoding:
Let xI=m(m+b) (mod p)
Let x2=m(m + b) (mod q)
Then let:
m1 =-b + (b2-_4*1x) (mod p)
2
m1=b- (b2-4*x1 ) (mod p)
2
m21= -b + (b2 .4*X2) (mod q)
2
m22 =-b - b2_4*x 2) (mod q)
2
( *).
(t).
(2).
(3).
(4).
(5).
(6).
Using the quadratic formulas, mi and m12, are the solutions of equation (1), and using m21
and m2 2 , are the solutions of equation (2). Since mi1 and m1 2 are the solutions to (1), and n2 and
m are the solutions to (2), four possible solutions can be found to (*) using the Chinese remainder
theorem. The four-solutions messages are as follows:
miI = ci*mit
m2 =cM
m3 =C 1*M12
m4 =C 1M12
+ C2*m 21 (mod p*q),
+ c2 *m22 (mod p*q),
+ c2 * m 21 (mod p*q), and
+ c2 *M22 (mod p*q),
where cl=q*qi=1 (mod p) and c2 =p*pI=I (mod q).
Another way to view this property is to observe the cross-product of primes resulting in the
four-solutions, two-solutions, and one-solution messages. Applying a change of variable as in chapter
four, the Rabin scheme reduces to:
n=y 2 (mod r)
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For this case the four-solutions messages will be ±y (mod p) and ±y (mod q). The four
solutions to the quadratic formulas, m 1 , i 1 2, m21 , and m22 can be combined using the Chinese
remainder theorem to get the above four-solutions messages. This is best illustrated in the cross-
product table below:
i ..............
M21
M22
0-1
M11 ..................
M1
M2
M3
M4 LID
R-1
Figure 5.2
M12 .................... P-1
In the figure the columns represent the residues modulo q and the rows represent the residues
modulo p. The entries in the table are the residues modulo r which are found by combining the
residues modulo q and p using the Chinese remainder theorem. From the figure, it is evident that
the four solutions to the quadratic equations can be combined to form four-solutions messages. Using
the cross-product table the four four-solutions messages lie directly below mi and m12, and directly
across from m21 and m2 2. If the discriminant of only one of the quadratic equations is zero, then
mil =in12 or m21 = " 22. Using the cross-product table again, the two-solutions messages lie directly
below mi 1 and/or m12 , and directly across from m21 and/or m2 2. As before if both discriminants are
zero, then m 1 =M 12 and m2 =M 22. Using the cross-product table again, the one-solution message
lies directly below mil and directly accross from m22.
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5.3 ONE DECRYP TION
This section discusses the various properties of the one-solution message and cryptogram.
Usually, there will be four-solutions as was stated in the previous section, but if the discriminant is
zero for both quadratic equations, then there will be only one solution (mod p) and only one solution
(mod q). These two solutions can then be combined using the Chinese remainder theorem to retrieve
the original message sent. This is the only case in which the decryption function is a one-to-one and
onto mapping from the cryptogram to the message. Other cases result in multiple solutions and a
degree of ambiguity.
If the discriminant, (b2-4*x), is zero for both quadratic equations, there is only one
solution. The equations (3-6) reduce to the following:
m1 -b/2 (mod p),
m12 = -b/2 (mod p),
m12 =-b/2 (mod q), and
M2 2 - -b/2 (mod q).
This is the degenerate case where m 1 1 =m 1 2 and m 21 =m 22 . Combining these two equations
with the Chinese remainder theorem, one obtains the true message:
m=cil + c2*m21 (mod p*q).
For any b, the output remains the same in terms of solutions and the distance between the
four-solutions, two-solutions and one-solution cryptograms remains the same (this fact will be
discussed later). In other words, the number of solutions for each cryptogram relative to the number
of solutions for other cryptograms in the cryptogram spectrum remains the same. The cryptogram
spectrum is all of the possible cryptograms. An interesting case is b=0, where the message equal to
zero causes the single one-solution cryptogram.
If b=0 and m=0, then
z=m 2 =0 (mod r),
and z has only one solution, and it is unique.
When b#0, the message corresponding to the one-solution cryptogram can still be found
easily by applying the Chinese remainder theorem to -b/2 (mod p) and -b/2 (mod q). It can be
shown that for b odd the one-solution message is (r-b)/2 (mod r), and for b even the one-solution
message is (r-1-b)/2 + (r-1)/2 (mod r).
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If the cryptogram was simply z-m 2 (mod p), it would be evident from the theory of
quadratic residues that one half of the cryptograms would be the same as the other half. In the
Rabin scheme if one considers b=O, then z=m 2 (mod p*q), and there must be a duplication of
cryptograms. This interesting phenomenon is called the duplication property in which the
cryptograms are duplicated around the one-solution cryptogram. In the modulo p case all messages
that are between 1 and (p-1)/2 encrypt to the same cryptograms as messages that are between (p-
1)/2+1 and (p-I) respectively. So all of the cryptograms are duplicated except the one at zero.
However, all the messages that are between 1 and (p-l)/2 encrypt to different cryptograms. For
modulo r=p*q case, all the messages between I and (r-l)/2 also encrypt to the same cryptograms as
messages between (r-l)/2+1 and (r-1). Thus, all of the cryptograms are duplicated except the one at
zero. However, not all the messages between I and (r-l)/2 encrypt to different cryptograms. In fact,
there may be at most two messages within half of the message spectrum that encrypt to the same
cryptogram. From the discussion it is clear that all of the cryptograms that are caused by messages
between 0 and (r-1)/2 are the same as cryptograms caused by messages between (r-l)/2+1 and (r-1).
Therefore, each cryptogram has a mirror image about the one-solution cryptogram, and the r=p*q
case is a mere extension of the quadratic residue property.
There is only a single one-solution message and one-solution cryptogram. An attack on the
Rabin scheme cannot be made just by knowing the one-solution message and/or the one-solution
cryptogram. Both the one-solution message and the one-solution cryptogram can always be found,
(since it is the encrypted version of the one-solution message) but, they do not provide a means to
break the Rabin scheme.
5.4 TWO DECRYPTIONS
5.4.1 PROPER TIES OF TWO DECRYPITIONS
This section discusses the various properties of the two-solutions messages and cryptograms.
Usually, there will be four-solutions as was stated in one of the previous sections. If the discriminant
is zero for only one of the quadratic equations, then there will be either only one solution (mod p)
and two solutions (mod q), or two solutions (mod p) and only one solution (mod q). These three
solutions can then be combined using the Chinese remainder theorem to retrieve two possible
messages that are encrypted to the same cryptogram.
If the discriminant- (b2-4*x) is zero for one of the quadratic equations, then there are
only two-solutions. The equations (3-6) reduce to the following:
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M= -b + (b2 -4*x) (mod p),
2
m12=-b - (b 2-4*x} (mod p),
2
m 21 =-b/2 (mod q), and
m2= -b/2 (mod q);
or
inii=-b/2 (mod p),
above
either
n 12=-b/2 (mod p),
m21=-b + (b2 .4x2) (mod q), and
2
m2=-b - (b2.4*x2) (mod q).
2
This is the degenerate case where m2 =m 22 or mI=m12. Depending upon which of the
cases is true, one can combine three equations using the Chinese remainder theorem to retrieve
m1 =c1 *Mn1 1 + c2*m2 (mod p*q), and
m3 =c 1**n2 + c2*m21 (mod p*q);
or
mi=cI*m1 1 + c2*mn2 (mod p*q), and
m2 =c I*m + c2 *m22 (mod p*q).
Once again we use the fact that no matter what b is chosen, the output remains the the same
in terms of solutions. For b = 0 the two-solutions cryptograms are only caused by messages that are
of the form cp or cq, except for the case when c=0, where c is some constant. Thus,
If b=0 and m=cp or cq, then z=m 2 (mod r),
and z has only two solutions for c#O.
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For b=0 the two-solutions messages are of the form cp or cq where c#0, since the choice of
b does not change the number of two-solutions messages, and their relative position with respect to
the one-solution message is the same. Therefore, the one-solution cryptogram is the base point
relative to which the other cryptograms shift. If m' is the one-solution message, then the two-
solutions messages will be m'+cp, m'-cp, m'+cq, or m'-cq, where c#0. The shift caused by the
choice of b is equivalent to the shift of the one-solution message from zero. The shift of the two-
solutions messages is (r-b)/2 (mod r) for b odd, and (r+ 1-b) + (r-l)/2 (mod r) for b even. Thus the
two-solutions messages for any b will be of the following form:
For odd b:
(r-b)/2 + cp (mod r),
(r-b)/2 - cp (mod r),
(r-b)/2 + cq (mod r), and
(r-b)/2 - cq (mod r).
For even b:
(r+1-b) + (r-1)/2 + cp (mod r),
(r+1-b) + (r-1)/2 - cp (mod r),
(r+1-b) + (r-1)/2 + cq (mod r), and
(r+1-b) + (r-1)/2 - cq (mod r).
Therefore, knowing p or q is equivalent to knowing the values of the two-solutions messages
and cryptograms. Conversely, knowing the values of the two-solutions messages is equivalent to
knowing p or q.
Once one finds a two-solutions cryptogram, z, with two-solutions messages, m, and m2, one
knows that the difference between mi and m2 is either cp or cq depending on whether the
discriminant for xi or x2 is zero. One can then define m3 and n4 to be functions of n1 such that z3
and z4 will differ by cp or cq depending on the difference between m and m2. Once a two-solutions
message or cryptogram is found, one can find both m's and z's that differ by cp or cq. If z is a two-
solutions cryptogram with two-solutions messages mi and m2 that differ by cp*, and mi is known,
then one can define n3 and m4 such that z3 and z4 differ by dp*. If one lets
m3 =n+1 and m4 =m -1, then
z=m 3(m3 + b) (mod r), and
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z4m4(M4+ b) (mod r) -
z4zz3= dp* (mod r),
where p* is p or q.
5.4.2 HA PPENINGS A ROUND TWO D ECR YPTIONS
This section discusses what happpens around the two-solutions messages and cryptograms. If
z is a two-solutions cryptogram with two-solutions messages, m and in', then let m1 be m*-l and m2
be m*+1, where n* is n or m'. The encryption of mi and m2 gives zI and z2 respectively. If the
two-solutions messages, m and i', are the shifted versions of the two-solutions messages for cp* when
b=O, then zt-z2 =dp*, where p* is p or q. Since different choices of b's do not matter, we can
consider the case for b=0. One then has the following:
If z has two solutions m and m' and m=cp* (c#0),
then let mi=m*-1 and m2 =m*+1 with
zi m12 (mod r) and
Z2 = m2 2 (mod r) then
z 1 Z2 -dp* (mod r).
The constraint that c#0 is very important. If c=0 was also a message for a two-solutions
cryptogram, then a two-solutions message, and z1-z2 could always be found. Then by using the
Euclidean algorithm, one could find p* and break the system. Unfortunately, if c=0, then the
message is a one-solution message.
The two-solutions messages lie at opposite ends of the (modulo r) field, because of the
duplication property. Each of the two-solutions messages lie the same distance (distance is the
difference between the messages) from the one-solution message. Therefore, the two-solutions
messages will be kp*+1 apart, where k is an even number.
As with duplication, other properties affect the locations of the two-solutions messages. In the
four-decryption section, the four-solutions messages are shown to be interrelated by the duplication
property or by the multiplication property. 'The latter property states that the distance between the
four-solutions messages is cp*. Two-solutions messages are related by the duplication property and
by the multiplication property. Thus, once again the two-decryption case is just a degenerate case of
the four-decryption case and the multiplication property arises because if the discriminant for xi is
zero, then the difference between the two-solutions messages will be cp. On the other hand, if the
discriminant for x2 is zero, then the difference between the two-solutions messages will be cq. Thus
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one has the following:
Define z1 =m(ml+b) (mod r) and z2=m 2(m2+b) (mod r).
If zi=Z2 and (b2-4x*)=0 (mod r) (meaning a two-solutions cryptogram, where x* is
either xi or x2 but not both), then
(in1 +m 2 +b)=(cp)(q) (mod r), and
(m1-M2)=cp*,
where p* is p, if x* is xi, or p* is q, if x* is x2-
From the value of b, the parity of constant, c, can be determined, i.e.: if b is even, then c is
even, and if b is odd, then c is also odd. A zero discriminant in the quadratic formula for either xi
or x2, resulted in a two-solution cryptogram, and the difference between the two-solutions messages
was either cp or cq. Thus one has the following:
Let z1=M(m+b) (mod r) and z2=m 2(m2+b) (mod r).
If zi=z 2 and (m+m 2+b)=(cp)(q) (duplication property), and (b2-4x*)=O, and b=even
(odd), then
(mI-m 2) = cp*
where c is even (odd), and p* is p, if x* is xi, and p* is q, if x* is x2.
5.4.3 SLIM CHANCE OF AT TACK WITH TWO DECRYPTIONS
With a two-solutions message known, cp or cq may be determined. If i1 is the two-solutions
message, then let m2 be il plus one, and let m3 be ml minus one. Then the difference between z2
and z3 is cp or cq, depending on whether the message is shifted from cp or cq when b equals zero.
If the message is shifted from cp* when b equals zero, then the difference between z2 and z3 is cp*.
Therefore, once cp* is found, the prime can be found by using the Euclidean algorithm for GCD's on
cp* and r. Once p* is known, the other prime is easily found, and the Rabin scheme is easily
broken.
Very few of the cryptograms are two-solutions cryptograms. An attack on the Rabin scheme
can be made, if either one of the two-solutions messages or either one of the two-solutions
cryptograms can be found. If a two-solutions message, rn, is found, it can be encrypted to find a two-
solutions cryptogram. If m1=m-1 and m2=m+1, then z-z 2 =cp or cq. If both of the two-solutions
messages are found, then their difference is cp or cq. There are (p+q-2)/2 possible number of two-
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solutions cryptograms, and the probability of finding a two-solutions message or cryptogram can be
quite large for p and q small. However, the limit of (p+q-2)/2*p*q is just i/p or l/q as p and q
become large and it would be very difficult to find two-solutions messages or cryptograms for large p
and q. Therefore, an attack which uses the above method is usually not possible, whether it uses the
ciphertext only attack, plaintext-ciphertext pair attack or the chosen plaintext attack. It is shown later
that a chosen ciphertext attack will work tinder the above method.
5.5 FOUR D ECRYPTIONS
This section discusses the various properties of the four-solutions messages and cryptograms.
This is the typical case and in practice all messages and cryptograms will be four-solutions messages
and four-solutions cryptograms respectively. If the two discriminants are nonzero, then there will be
four solutions to the quadratic formulas. These four solutions can be combined using the Chinese
remainder theorem to retrieve four possible messages that are encrypted to the same cryptogram.
From the previous discussion on two-decryptions and one-decryption, one can ascertain that all the
rest of the messages and cryptograms that are not in the two-decryptions or one-decryption case are
four-solutions messages and cryptograms.
The interrelation between the four-solutions messages for a particular four-solutions
cryptogram is sLated by the duplication and multiplication properties. The duplication property
divides the four-solutions messages into two equal groups and the correspondence between the two
groups is governed by the multiplication property. Suppose that the four-solutions messages to the
four-solutions cryptogram, z are m, m 2, m3, and m4 and that the first group contains mi and m3 and
the second group contains n2 and m 4. Then ml minus in 2, or ml rninus m4 is a nultiple of p*, and
m3 minus m 2, or m3 minus m4 is also a multiple of p*, regardless of the b chosen. Thus one has the3
following:
Define zi=m1(m,+b) (mod r), and z2 =m 2(m2 +b) (mod r) with
and zi=z2 -
Then
m1 -m2=cp* or
(in1+m 2+b)=(cp)(q)=O (mod r).
Therefore, the above shows that if three of the four four-solutions messages were found, the
scheme could be broken with probability 1. This is because two of the three solutions will exhibit the
property that ml minus m2 will be cp*. Now, the Euclidean algorithm for g.c.d. can be used to find
p or q, and the other prime falls out trivially. If two of the four four-solutions messages were found,
the scheme could be broken with probability of . This is one reason why the chosen ciphertext
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attack works, and is similar to the two-decryptions case, in which the knowledge of a two-solutions
message will break the scheme. In this case three of the four-solutions messages are needed in order
to ensure a break the scheme.
For the two-decryptions or four-decryptions case in which two messages m1 and m 2 differ by
cp* there is a property concerned with messages that are exactly in the middle of the two messages
mi and m2. Messages that are exactly in the middle, i' and m2', will only differ by one and have
cryptograms z ' and z 2' that differ by cp*. The difference between z ' and z2' is cp or cq depending
on whether m1 -m2 is cp or cq. Therefore,
define zi=(njni+b) (mod r), and z2 =in2(m 2 +b) (mod r).
If z,-z2 and mrm2 =cp*, and c is odd then define:
rn'=L(m2 m 1 l)/2J + mi - I (mod r) and
m2'= L(m 2 mi1 +1)/2J + m, (mod r) -+
Z2 -zt =dp* (mod r).
Four-solutions cryptograms around the two-solutions cryptograms exhibit a strange behavior.
Let a two-solutions cryptogram, z, have two-solutions messages, n and n' and let m1 be m*+k and
m2 be m*-k, where m* is either m or n'. If z, is the cry,)togram for in, and z2 is the cryptogram for
m2, then z, and z2 differ by dp or dq depending on whether m* is a shifted version of m*=cp or
m*=cq when b=0. Therefore,
Let mi=m*+k and m2 =m+k
m=cp* and
zi=m1 2 (mod r) and
z2 =m 2
2 (mod r) -+
z,-z2 = dp* (mod r).
The four-solutions messages are duplicated across the imaginary line where the one-solution
message is located, another instance of the duplication property. The boundaries of the two groups
duplicated across the imaginary line can easily be found. One of the boundaries is at the one-solution
message and the other boundary is half way around the message spectrum from the one-solution
message, specifically:
pt1 =L((r+1-b)/2)J (mod r) and
pt2 = L((r+1-b)/2)J + L((r-1)/2)J (mod r).
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The message spectrum are all of the possible messages.
Most of the cryptograms are four-solutions cryptograms. An attack on the Rabin scheme can
be made if three of the four-solutions messages can be found, or, possible with only two of the four-
solutions messages. If the four-solutions messages are mi, m2, n 3, and m4 , then there exist two pairs
such that the difference between the messages within the pairs is cp or cq. Therefore, if one can
separate the messages into pairs, such that mi= M (mod p), m2 =-m (mod p), m3 =m (mod q), and
m4=-m (mod q), then m1 -m2 is cp and m 3-m4 is cq. Only one of these pairs of four-solutions
messages needs to be found to break the Rabin scheme. Therefore, if the cryptanalyst has two four-
solutions messages, he may have one of these pairs and if he has three four-solutions messages, one of
these pairs is guaranteed. There are (p*q-p-q+1)/4 possible four-solutions cryptograms. It is not
difficult to find four-solutions messages since most messages are of the four-decryption type.
However, it is extremely difficult to find two or three of the four-solutions messages that encrypt to
the same four-solutions cryptogram. Therefore, an attack which uses the above method is usually not
possible, whether it uses the ciphertext only attack, plaintext-ciphertext pair attack or the chosen
plaintext attack. It is shown later that a chosen ciphertext attack will work with the above method.
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6 PROPERTIES OF B'S IN THE RABIN SCHEME
6.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses the effects of choosing different b's on the Rabin scheme. The
parameter b has no effect on the cryptograms except for a shift of the relative positions of the
cryptograms with respect to the messages. The number of four-solutions, two-solutions, and one-
solution cryptograms remains the same for different b's as do the relative positions of the four-
solutions, two-solutions, and one-solution cryptograms with respect to each other. Some of the
subproperties are counterintuitive, while other subproperties are very intuitive. The four major sub-
properties are as follows: 1) for b=1, 2, 3, ... (r-l)/2 the scheme has the same cryptograms as for
b=-l, -2, -3, ... (1-r)/2, respectively, except the values of the cryptograms are shifted with respect to
the values of the messages; 2) as b varies the number of four-solutions, two-solutions, and one-
solution cryptograms remain the same. For any b not equal to 0 (mod p) or 0 (mod q) the number
of cryptograms of the form z=0 (mod p) or 0 (mod q) remain the same. Also, the pattern which
relates cryptograms to their respective numbers of solutions shifts with respect to the values of the
messages; and 3) for b=-k (mod p) or -j (mod q) or k (mod p) or j (mod q) there is a method to
find a cryptogram that equals 0 (mod p) or 0 (mod q). Therefore, the choice of b has no effect, and
that the breaking of the Rabin scheme for one b breaks the Rabin scheme for all b's.
6.2 FOR B =1, 2, 3, ... (IODULUS-1)/2 T HE SCHEIME IH/AS T HE SAME
CR YPTOGRA MS AS FOR B = -1, -2, -3, ... (1-MODULUS) /2, RESPECT IVE L,
EXCEPT THE VA LUES OF THE CR YPTOGRA MS A RE SHIFTED WITH
RESPECT TO THE VA L UES OF THE MESSA GES
This section shows that for b=1, 2, 3, ... (r-1)/2, the scheme has the same cryptograms as for
b = -1, -2, -3, ... (1-r)/2, respectively, however the values of the cryptograms are shifted with respect to
the values of the messages. This means that only half the b's give rise to different cryptograms.
THEOREM: m(m+b)=m'(m'-b) (mod r)
if m'=m+b, or (m+m')=cp or cq
PROOF OF THEOREM:
Let z=m(m+b) (mod r) and z'=m'(m'+b) (mod r) then
z-z'=m 2-m'2 +(m+m')b=O (mod r)
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=(m+m')(m-m')+(m +m')b=0 (mod r)
=(m+m')(m-m'+b)=0=cp*cq (mod r),
so, either
m'=-m, or
m'=m+b.
Therefore, either (m+m')=cp or cq, or
(m-m'+b)=O (mod r)-+ni'=m+b (mod r).
The second case implies that for b and -b, the same cryptograms result. QED.
6.3 AS B VARIES TH E NUMBER OF FOUR-SOLUTIONS, TWO-
SOLUTIONS, ONE-SOLUTIONREMAIN THE SAME. FOR ANY B NOT EQUAL
TO 0 (MOD P) OR 0 (MOD Q) THE NUMBER OF CRYPTOGRAMS OF THE
FORMO(MOD P)OR0(MODQ) REMAINS THE SAME. INADDITION THE
PAT'TERN WHICH RELA7'ES CRYVP TOGRAMS TO THEIR RESPECTIVE
NUMBER OF SOLUTIONS SHIFTS WITH RESPECT TO THE VALUES OF THE
MESSA GES
This section shows that no matter which b is chosen, the number of four-solutions, two-
solutions, and one-solution cryptograms remain the same. For any b not equal to cp or cq, the
number of cryptograms that are cp or cq also remains the same. Also, the pattern which relates
cryptograms to their respective numbers of solutions shifts with respect to the values of the messages .
The shift is only a function of the b's; thus, the shift from one set of cryptograms to the other is
determined by the two b's. If one of the b's chosen is b=O, the effect of a particular b is just a
shift. Since there is only a single one-solution message for each message spectrum, one can analyze
how the message shifts when b changes. Therefore, the shift for that particular b can be determined
because the four-solutions, two-solutions and one-solution messages remain in the same positions
relative to the one-solution message for any b, as previously discussed.
(2 2 -b12) (mod r)
4
for b2>bi, and
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(b, 2 -b_22) (mod r)
4
for b>b2.
PROOF:
Without loss of generality assume that b2>bl and that the cryptogram used in the analysis is
the one-solution message. For the two one-solution messages one has the following:
mi=-b,/2 (mod r)
and
m2 =-b 2/2 (mod r).
Then,
zl=(-b±/2)2 + b,(-bl/2) (mod r)
z2=(-b 2 /2) 2 + b2(-b2/2) (mod r).
So,
z-z 2 =(-b1 /2) 2 - (-b2/2) 2 + bl(-b1/2) - b2(-b2/2) (mod r)
=(-b1 /2 + -b2/2)(-b 1/2 - -b2/2) + bl(-b1/2) - b2(-b2/2) (mod r)
-(bl+b2)/2 * (bL-b 2)/2 + -(bl/2)2 + (b2/2) 2 (mod r)
(b+b 2)/2 * (bl-b 2)/2 + (b22 - b12)/2 (mod r)
=(b 2-b22)/4 + (b22 - bi 2)/2 (mod r)
_(b22-b 1 2) (mod r)
4
When for b=O the one-solution is zero, and the value of the one-solution cryptogram for b#O
is always -(b 2)/4 (mod r). Thus, the shift must be (b22 - b1 2)/4 (mod r). QED.
This proof demonstates that the choice of the parameter b has little effect on the strength of
the Rabin scheme, and so will not protect the scheme from the clustering effect. Nor will the
scheme be protected from a cryptanalyst attempting to find a two-solutions message or three of the
four-solutions messages. Since a shift of (b22 - b12)/4 is involved in changing the b's, breaking the
scheme for a particular b, such as b=0, breaks the scheme for all b. Therefore, the parameter b does
not enhance the security of the scheme, in fact, by choosing the wrong b or too many b's one may
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make the system less secure.
6.4 FOR B= RESIDUE (MOD P) OR RESIDUE (MOD Q) THERE IS A
ME THOD TO FIND A CRYPTOGRAM THAT EQUALS
0 (MOD P) OR 0 (MOD Q)
If the cryptanalyst can approximate the difference between b and cp or cq, he can find cp or
cq. Thus, the choice of a particular b is very important. Let mi and m 2 be the two messages that
cause two equivalent cryptograms, z1 and z2, and let mi and m 2 be at the other end of the message
spectrum from the one-solution message. These cryptograms are equivalent because of the
duplication property. If b is cp-1, cq-1, cp+1, or cq+ (with c not equal to zero), then z, and Z2'
are of the form dp or dq.
THEOREM: If b-cp*-l or cp*+1, and c#O, where cp* is cp or cq, then:
CASE 1: b is odd with mt=(r-b)/2 + (r-1)/2 + I (mod r) and m 2 =(r-b)/2 + (r-l)/2
(mod r)-+z1 =z 2 =dp*.
CASE 2: b is even with m 1 =(r-I-b)/2 (mod r) and m 2 =(r+1-b)/2 (mod r)-+*z=z2=dp*.
PROOF: CASE 1:
1) For b=cp*-1, and c#O, and b even, then for zi:
zi=m1 2 + m1 *b
=(r-1-b)2 + b(r-l-b) (mod r),
2 2
but (r-1-b) = (r-1-(cp*-1)) = (r-cp*) (mod r)
2 2 2
-*z =(r-cp*)2 + cp*(r-cp*) - (r-cp*) (mod r)
2 2 2
=(cp*)2dp'*-1) 2 + (cp*)2(dp*-1) - cp*(dp'*-1) (mod r),
2 2 2
where if dp* = dp, then dp'* = dq, and if dp* = dq, then dp'* = dp,
=(cp*)2(cp*(dp'*-1)2 + cp*(dp'*-1) - (dp'*-1)) (mod r)
4 2 2
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=dp* (mod r)
QED.
2) For z2:
z2=M22 + m2*b (mod r)
z2=(r+1-b)2 + b(r+1-b) (mod r),
2 2
but (r+1-b)=(r+l-(cp*-1)) = (r-cp*+2) (mod r)
2 2 2
-+02=(r-cp*+2)2 + cp*(r-cp*+2) - (r-cp*+2) (mod r)
2 2 2
=(-cp*+2)2 + cp*(-cp*+2) - (-cp*+2) (mod r)
2 2 2
=((cp*) 2-4*cp*+4) + (-(cp*2 + 4*cp*) + (2*cp*-4) (mod r)
4 4 4
=((cp*) 2-4*cp*+4-2(cp*)2 +4*cp*+2*cp*-4) (mod r)
4
=(-(cp*)22*cp*) (mod r)
4
=dp* (mod r)
QED.
3) For b=cp*+1, and c#O, and b even, then for z,:
zi=m 12 + mi*b (mod r)
z =(r-1-b)2 + b(r-1-b) (mod r),
2 2
but (r-1-b)=(r-1-(cp*+1)) = (r-cp*-2) (mod r)
2 2 2
-+Z =(r-cp*-2) 2 + cp*(r-cp*-2) - (r-cp*-2) (mod r)
2 2 2
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(-cp*-2)2 + cp*(-cp*-2) - (-cp*-2) (mod r)
2 2
=((cp*)2+4*cp*+4) + (-(cp*) 2 - 4*cp*) - (2*cp*-4) (mod r)
4 4 4
=((cp*) 2 +4*cp*+4-2(cp*) 2-4*cp*-2*cp*-4) (mod r)
4
=(-(cp*) 2-2*cp*) (mod r)
4
=dp* (mod r)
QED.
4) For z2:
z2=m22 + m2*b (mod r)
=(r+1-b)2 + b(r+1-b) (mod r),
2 2
but (r+1-b) = (r+1-(cp*+1)) = (r-cp*) (mod r)
2 2 2
--+2=_(r-cp*)2 + cp*(r-cp*) + (r-cp*) (mod r)
2 2 2
=(cp*)2(dp-_1)2 + (cp*) 2(dp'*-1) + cp*(dp'*-1) (mod r),
2 2 2
where if dp* = dp, then dp'* = dq, and if dp* = dq, then dp'* = dp,
=(cp*) 2(p*(dp'*-1) 2 + cp*(dp'*-1) + (dp'*-1)) (mod r)
4 2 2
=dp* (mod r)
QED.
CASE 2: For b odd, then: miL=(r-b+r-I)/2 + 1=(-1-b)/2 + 1=(1-b)/2 (mod r), and
m 2= (r-b+r-l)/2 =(-1-b)/2=(-b-1)/2 (mod r).
1) For b=cp*-1, and c#O, and b odd, then for zi,
2
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zi={1-b) 2 + b(1-b) (mod r)
2 2
=(1-2*b+b 2) + (b-b2) (mod r)
2 2
=(1-2*b+b 2+2*b-2*b 2) (mod r)
4
-(I-b 2) (mod r)
4
=(1-(cp*-1) 2) (mod r)
4
=1-((cp*) 2-2*cp*+1) (mod r)
4
=(I-(cp*) 2+2*cp*-1) (mod r)
4
=(-(cp*) 2+2*cp*) (mod r)
4
=dp* (mod r)
QED.
2) For b odd, and b=cp*-1, and c#O, then for z2:
z2={f-b)2 + b(-1-b) (mod r)
2 2
=(b 2 +2*b+l) + (-b-b 2) (mod r)
4 2
={b 2 +2*b+1-2*b-2*b 2) (mod r)
4
(2)=(-b2±1) (mod r)
4
=(-(cp*-1) 2 +1) (mod r)
4
(1)
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=(-(cp*)2+2*cp*-l+1) (mod r)
4
=(-(cp*) 2 +2*cp*) (mod r)
4
=dp* (mod r)
QED.
3) For b=cp*+1, and c#O and b odd, from equation (1):
zi=( -b2) (mod r)
4
=(1-(cp*+1)2) (mod r)
4
=(1-((cp*)2 +2*cp*+I)) (mod r)
4
=(1-(cp*)2-2*cp*-1) (mod r)
4
=(-(cp* 2 2*cp*) (mod r)
4
=dp* (mod r)
QED.
4) For b=cp*+1, and c#O, and b odd, from equation (2):
z2 =(-b2+1) (mod r)
4
=(-(cp*+1) 2±1) (mod r)
4
=(-(cp*) 2-2*cp*-l+1) (mod r)
4
=(-(cp) 2 -2*cp*) (mod r)
4
(1)
(2)
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=dp* (mod r)
QED.
This theorem can be extended to include b's of the form cp-k, cp-j, cp+k, or cq+j. Let
messages mi and m 2 be the two messages that cause two equivalent cryptograms, zi and z2, and let
mi and m 2 be at the other end of the message spectrum from the one-solution message i4*2(k*-,
where k* is k or j. Again the cryptograms are equivalent because of the duplication property. If b is
cp-k, cq-j, cp+k, or cq-j (with c not equal to zero), then z, and z2 are of the form dp or dq.
THEOREM: If b=cp*-k* or cp*+k* and c#O where cp* is cp or cq and k* is k or j, then
CASE 1: b is odd with ml=(r-b)/2 + (r-1)/2 + 1 + 4 *2 (k*-2) (mod r) and m 2 =(r-b)/2 +
(r-l)/2 - 4 *2 (k*-2) (mod r)-+zt=z 2 =dp*.
CASE 2: b is even with m 1 =(r-1-b)/2 + 4 *2(k*-2) (mod r) and m2 =(r+1-b)/2 - 4*2(k*-2)
(mod r)-*zt=z 2 dp
PROOF: The proof proceeds identically for k=j=1. QED.
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7ADDITIONAL DISCOVERED PROPERTIES OF THE RABIN SCHEME
7.1 INTRODUCTION
In the Rabin scheme, seven additional properties are of particular interest. These are: 1)
cryptograms and messages of the form 0 (mod p) or 0 (mod q); 2) the encryption function which
maps r possible messages into only about r/4 possible cryptograms; 3) m=z; 4) m=-b; 5) ztz 2 =0
(mod p) or 0 (mod q); 6) repeated encryption; and 7) the relative speeds of the Rabin and the
Rivest-Shamir-Adleman schemes.
As always, the properties of the Rabin scheme are essential to cryptanalysis, since in order to
find the weaknesses of a scheme one must First find its properties. The properties lead to sonic very
interesting cryptanalysis attacks on the Rabin scheme. Some of the properties are counterintuitive,
while others are intuitive.
7.2 CRYPTOGRA MS A ND MESSAGES OF THE FORM 0 (MOD P) OR 0
(MOD) Q
7.2.1 MESSAGE IS OF THE FORM 0 (MOD P) OR 0 OD) Q
Whether the message, in is a multiple of p or q, has a pronounced effect on the cryptogram.
If the message is of the form cp or cq, then the cryptogram z is also of the form cp or cq. Therefore,
m=cp -> z=dp, or
m=cq -+ z=dq.
There are (p+q-1) of the form cp or cq.
7.2.2 CRYPTOGRA M IS OF THE FORM 0 (MOD P) OR 0 (MOD) Q
The effects of a cryptogram which is a multiple of cp or eq are more profound than those of
the message. If the cryptogram is a multiple of cp or cq, then there is an algorithm to break the
Rabin scheme. If the message is of the forn cp or cq, then the cryptogram is of the form cp or cq,
but not vice-versa. If the cryptogram is of the form cp or eq, the message must be of the form cp,
cq, cp-b, or eq-b. Therefore,
m+b=cp -+ z=dp, or
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m+b=cq -> z=dq.
If another cryptogram z1 can be found such that zi is of the form cp or cq, and mI is not of
the form cp or cq, then the following property becomes apparant If m, is added to b to form a new
message m2 , then m2 is of the form cp or cq, and it follows that z2 is of the form dp or dq. If m 2 is
of the form cp, then z2 is also of the form dp, but if m2 is of the form cq, then z2 is of the form dq.
This method can be used to find additional messages and cryptograms of the form cp or cq once the
first is found. When two numbers of the form cp or cq are found, then the Euclidean algorithm for
g.c.d can be used, to find p and q. The probability of this attack succeeding is low, since the user
will not ordinarily use a message of the form cp or cq, and the probability for a cryptogram of the
form cp or cq is also low. Therefore,
m1#cp*, and (b,r)=1, and
zI=m 12 +m 1 *b=cp*
m2 =m1 +b=dp*, and
z2 =m 2
2 +m 2*b=ep*,
where p* is either p or q.
The number of cryptograms of the form cp or cq depends on b:
for b#cp*, one has 2(p+q-2) cryptograms,
for b=cp*, one has 2(p*-I) + p'* cryptograms, and
for b=O, one has (p+q-1) cryptograms.
7.2.3 SLIM CHANCE OFA TTACK WITH CRYPTOGRAMS OF T HE FORM
0 (MOD P) OR 0 (MOD) Q OR MESSAGES OF THE FORM 0 (MOD P) OR 0
(MOD) Q
If z or m is found such that z=cp or eq or m=cp or cq, then p or q can easily be found. If
m is cp*, then z is also cp*, and the Euclidean algorithm for g.c.d.'s on m and zyields p*. If z is cp
or cq simply encrypt z to get z' which is also cp*. Therefore, one can find p* by using the Euclidean
algorithm for g.c.d.'s on z and z'.
Very few cryptograms or messages are of the form cp or cq. An attack on the Rabin scheme
is possible, if a message or cryptogram is of the form cp or cq, where there are (p+q-1) of these.
The number of cryptograms of the form cp or eq depends on b. For b=O one has (p+q-1)
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cryptograms of the form cp or cq; for b=cp* one has 2 (p*-l)+p'* cryptograms of the form cp or
cq; and for b#cp* one has 2(p+q-2) cryptograms of the form cp or cq. Where p'* is p is p* is q
and p'* is q if p* is p. Therefore, for small p and q, the probability for finding messages and/or
cryptograms of the form cp or cq is quite large. However, as p and q become large, the limit of
(p+q-1)/(p)(q) for messages, or
2(p+q-2)/(p)(q) for becp*, or
2(p*-)+p'*/(p)(q) for b=cp*, or
(p+q-1)/(p)(q) for b=0,
is just 1/p or 1/q. Therefore, it would be very difficult to find messages or cryptograms that are of
the form cp or cq for large p and q.
7.3 THE ENCRYPTION FUNCTION MAPS ALL POSSIBLE MESSAGES
INTO APPROXIMAT ELY ONE FOURTH OF THE RANGE
The fact that the number of possible cryptograms is only about one fourth of r is due mainly
to the four-solutions, two-solutions and one-solution cryptograms. The exact number of possible
cryptograms is (p+q+l+p*q)/4, which is approximately r/4, since r/4 is p*q/4. This fact means
that only about one fourth of the possible cryptograms can be used, which causes bandwidth
expansion. By using either r=p or q, then the brandwidth expansion would only be r/2 because of
the quadratic residue properties. The bandwidth expansion is 3/4*r for r=p*q. If r is large enough,
then bandwidth expansion can be minimized. By counting, one can easily find the actual number of
possible cryptograms. Since any cryptogram spectrum is just a shift of the b = 0 cryptogram spectrum,
one can count the possible number of cryptograms for b=0, which is p*q, for p*q possible messages.
from the p*q possible messages, there are (p+q-1) possible cp or cq messages, since they overlap for
c=0. There are (p+q-2) possible messages which cause two-solutions cryptograms and there is one
possible message that causes the one-solution cryptogram. Therefore, the rest of the messages must
cause four-solutions cryptograms totalling ((p*q) - (p+q-2) - 1)=(p*q - p - q + 1) four-solutions
messages. Thus, the number of possible z's is one times the number of one-solution messages, plus
two times the number of two-solutions messages, plus four times the number of four-solutions
messages. This results in (p + q + 1 + p*q)/4 possible cryptograms.
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THEOREM: The number of different possible z's are:
(p*q + p + q + 1) (mod r)
4
PROOF:
Let
mi-number of
m2 -number of
m4-number of
m1 =1, m 2 =(p
Thus,
the number of
the number of
one-solution messages,
two-solutions messages, and
four-solutions messages.
+ q - 2), and m4 =(p*q - (p + q - 2) -1)=(p*q - p - q + 1).
cryptograms
cryptograms
caused by mi is: I (mod r),
caused by m 2 is: (p + q - 2) (mod r), and
2
the number of cryptograms caused by m 4 is: (p*q - p - q + 1) (mod r).
4
Therefore, the total number of cryptograms is:
(p*q - p - q + 1) + (p + q - 2) +'1 (mod r),
4 2
which is,
(p*q - p - q + I + 2 *p + 2*q - 4 + 4) (mod r)
4
=(p*q + p + q + 1) (mod r)
4
QED.
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7.4 MESSAGE EQUALS THE CRYPTOGRAM
The chance of the message being equal to the cryptogram is slight; but if it occurs, the
message is either of the form cp or cq, or the message is zero (which is the same as c=O for the
previous case), or the message is 1-b. Thus, if a message is found to equal the cryptogram, then by
using the Euclidean algorithm, one can find cp or eq.
If m=z, then
m=m 2 +m*b (mod r)
O=m 2-+m(b-1) (mod r)
O=m(m+b-1) (mod r),
so, either
m=O (mod r), or m=1-b (mod r), or m-cp or cq (mod r).
7.5 MESSAGE EQUALS -B
If the message is -b and one of the p's is known, then there is a chance of finding cp or cq.
Given message, m2, is -b, and message, m , is m2 ~(P*~b), where p* is p oi q, then the cryptograms z,
and z2 differ by cp or cq. From this point the subtraction of one from m2 to produce m3, and the
addition of one to in to produce m4 , will lead to cryptograms z4 and z3 such that their difference is
cp or cq. Also, the addition of one to m2 to produce n3, and the subtraction of one from mi to
produce m4 , will lead to cryptograms, z3 and z4, such that their difference is cp or cq.
Let p*=p or q and m2 =-b.
Then
O=m22 + m2*b (mod r)
O=m 1 =m2 -(p*-b) (mod r)-+
z 1 z2 =cp* (mod r).
7.6 TWO CR YPTOGRAMS OF THE FORM 0 (MOD ) OR 0 (MOD) Q
Let messages, mi, m2, m3, and m4 encrypt to cryptograms, zi, z2, z3, and z4 respectively. If
the difference between zi and z2 is cp or cq, then for m3 equal m, plus some constant k, and for M4
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equal m 2 minus some constant k, then the difference between z3 and z4 is cp or cq. Therefore, once
a set of cryptograms, differing by cp or cq is determined, many more can be found.
Let zi=m(ml+b) (mod r) and z2=m 2(m2 +b) (mod r) and p*=p or q.
Then z-z 2 =cp* -+
either (m 1 .m2)=cp* or (mI+m 2 +b)=cp*.
Letting m3 =mI+k and m4 =m 2-k and
z3 =(mI+k)2 + b(ml+k) (mod r)
z4=(m-k)2 + b(m2-k) (mod r),
then z3 -z4 =cp* (mod r).
7.7 R EPEA TED ENCR YPTION
This section deals with the properties of repeated encryption. If an encrypted message is
followed by the repeated encryption of its cryptogram, there is a possibility of finding cp or cq. This
property is related to the number of solutions property. If a message is repeatedly encrypLed,
eventually the repeated encryption will produce a cryptogram identical to the original cryptogram z.
The cryptogram encrypted to the original cryptogram will be called z'. Once the first cryptogram is
formed by encrypting z', several interesting properties concerning the message, m, the cryptograms, z
and z'. One of the following relationships will occur, for the case of b=0: 1) z' minus m is cp or cq,
2) z' equals m, 3) z' minus z is cp or cq, or 4) z' plus m is r. If z' minus m is cp or cq, or z' minus
z is cp or cq, then the Rabin scheme can be broken. If z' is equal to m, then the message is found.
The only case where no information is found is when z' plus m is equal to r. Case 3) only occurs
together with case 4). The other cases are mutually exclusive. Therefore, to perform a known
plaintext attack, simply for a known cryptogram in the plaintext, obtain the resulting cryptogram, and
repeat the procedure. For the successive finds a search continues until the last cryptogram obtained
equals the original cryptogram, then one of the four cases will occur. One would eventually find cp
or cq. On the other hand, to perform a chosen plaintext attack, used repeated encryption to find cp
or cq providing case 4) occured infrequently.
This property is similar to the number of solutions property because if z' minus m is cp or cq,
then z' is one of the other four-solutions message caused by the multiplication propertys, such that mi
minus m2 is cp or cq. If z' plus i equal r, then z' is one of the other four-solutions messages caused
by the duplication property, such that m2 =-mi. If z'=m then z' is one of the four-solution messages
which is the original message. Encrypting m or z' results in the same cryptogram. If m is cp or cq,
and if another message m2 is found to cause the same cryptogram, then mI minus m 2 is cp or cq.
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Thus, the repeated encryption property may be used as a potential attack against the Rabin scheme.
7.8 THE SPEED OF THE RABIN SCHEME RELATIVE TO THE SPEED OF
THE RSA SCHEME
This section discusses the relative speed of the Rabin and the RSA schemes. As far as
encryption is concerned, the Rabin scheme is faster, since it only involves taking the message to the
power of two while the RSA scheme takes the message, M to some power. Therefore the Rabin
scheme takes on the order of 0(1) time while the RSA scheme takes on the order of 0(log2 r) time to
encrypt. On the other hand, the RSA and the Rabin scheme take about the same time in the
decryption. Since the RSA scheme takes the cryptogram, C, to some power (mod r) and requires on
the order of 0(log 2 r) time. The Rabin scheme has two forms of decryption depending on the form
of the primes. If the form is p=q=4k-d, then the decryption involves taking the cryptogram, C, to
the (p+1)/4 power. Using the fact that:
L=( )F=C(p+1)/4 -
L2=C(p+1)/2=C*C(p-l)/ 2 -C (mod p),
the Rabin scheme decryption takes on the order of 0(log2 r) time. If the primes are of the form
p=q=4k +-1, then Rabin uses a probabilistic algorithm, which is a special case of the Berlekamp's
root-finding algorithm in GF(p). The algorithm finds the square root by taking the g.c.d. and also
requires on the order of 0(log 2 r) time to accomplish the square root. The algorithm finds the roots
of m(m+b)=z or m2+m*b+z=(m-a)(mn-#), where the roots of the equation x(p-1 12-1=0 (mod p)
are the quadratic residues -yEGF(p). If a is a quadratic residue and # is not, then
(m(P1 )' 2 -1,m 2 +m*b+z)=(m-a),
so that # = -(b + a) and a (mod p).
If a and # are both quadratic residues or quadratic non-residues (mod p) with a##l, then a
different approach is needed. Let 6 be such that 0<8<p. If (a+8)/(#3+8) is a quadratic residue
(mod p), then a+8 and +8 are still both quadratic residues or quadratic non-residues. As we
choose different 8 in the range 0<8<p, except for 8= -#, the quotient (a + S)/( + 8)= y takes on all
the values in the range 0-y<p except -y=1. Therefore, for (p-l)/2 different choices of 8, the
parameters a+6 and #3+8 will not both be quadratic residues or quadratic non-residLics. Since we
have that
(m-8) 2+ (m-8)*b + z=(m-a-8)(m-#3-8),
if y is chosen at random, then with a probability of we have:
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(m(p-1)/2-1,(m-8)2+(m-8)*b+z)=m-a-8 or m-#-8.
On an average, only two values of 8 need to be tried before one finds the roots. The user
can easily find a or #3, the real roots since he knows 8. In conclusion the computation of the g.c.d.
requires on the order of O(log2 r) operations, so the decryption of the Rabin scheme and the RSA
scheme both take O(log 2 r) time.
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8 A MBIGUITY PROBLEM OF THE RABIN SCHEME
8.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses the ambiguity problem of the Rabin scheme. The ambiguity problem
is to decide which of the four-solution messages found in decryption is the original message. There
are several possible approaches to solve the problem by: 1) the simple parity check; 2) the choice of
largest solution; 3) the choice of a set of possible messages; 4) coding; and 5) the use of the
Williams scheme.
Of the Five possibilities only the last two seem to be the most reliable. The Rabin scheme will
only be effective if a correct choice between the four-solutions messages was made.. Since the
encryptions and decryptions would probably be done by computers, a method for determining which
of the four-solutions message is the original message should be deterministic withour human aid. It is
important to note that when the cryptograms are sent in blocks they are often context-dependent and
it is difficult to determine which of the four-solutions message is the original message even with
human aid.
8.2 TiHE SIMPLE PARITY CHECK
Parity checks can be used to resolve the ambiguity problem. A parity check consists of
tacking a set of parity bits in front of the message, which are either all zero's, all one's, or some fixed
set of bits. This alerts the receiver to which of the four-solutions messages or two-solutions messages
is the correct message. This method does not always, work since messages that differ by only p or q
may have caused the same cryptogram and such messages are so close together that the parity bits
cannot determine which of the solutions is the message. In other words, the parity added to the
messages should have the following property: when the parity is added, the receiver should be able
to distinguish which solution is the message, even though the solutions may only be one prime apart.
Ordinarily the solutions will differ greatly, but in some cases a large number of parity bits must be
added to distinguish the message from all of the solutions to insure proper decryption. Adding a
large number of bits increases bandwidth and makes this method undesirable. Alternatively a parity
check, may be used when proper decryption is not necessary at all times. The reasoning is that
different solutions will usually differ by a large amount.
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8.3 THE CHOICE OF LA RGEST SOLUTION
Using the largest solution as the message to resolve the ambiguity problem is possible.
Unfortunately, this method will not work, however, because the largest solution is not always the
correct solution. The four-solutions do not fall into groups with the solutions always occurring in the
following fashion: the first solution always between 0 and r/4; the second solution between r/4+1
and r/2; the third solution between r/2+1 and 3r/4; and the fourth solution between 3r/4 and r-1.
Therefore, the largest solution method does not solve the ambiguity problem since the solutions can
differ by an amount as small as p or q.
8.4 THE CHOICE OF A SET OF POSSIBLE MESSAGES
Publishing a set of possible messages consisting of at most (p*q+p+q-1)/4 elements, is
another possibility. This is because r distinct messages would only encrypt to (p*q+p+q-l)/4
distinct cryptograms. The method is to select one message from each of the two-solutions messages
and four-solutions messages and then publishes the set, so that anyone sending messages to him must
choose from the allowable messages. Again, this method does not work, because the cryptanalyst
could isolate which messages were used and which avoided, and find cp or cq. In addition, the
cryptanalyst couid use one of the two-solutions messages and break the Rabin scheme. Even the
deletion of the two-solutions message from the set would not prevent the cryptanalyst from
determining cp or cq. The Williams scheme is essentially a method to publish a set of possible
messages without allowing the cryptanalyst any additional information.
8.5 CODING
This section discusses the possibility of using codes to solve the ambiguity problem of the
Rabin scheme. If a set of code bits are appended onto the end of each block of cryptograms, it is
possible to indicate which of the four-solutions messages in the decryption is the original message,
although this may require added effort, it may be the only way to alert the receiver to the correct
solution. For example, tack two bits onto the end of the cryptogram stating which of the four-
solution messages is the original four-solutions messages.
8.6 THE USE OF T HE WILLIAMS SCHEME
This section discusses the possibility of using the Williams scheme instead of the Rabin
scheme. The Williams scheme discussed in detail in this dissertation, solves the ambiguity problem
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by restricting the possible sets of messages to approximately 3/16 to 1/4 of all possible messages.
Therefore, the ambiguity problem no longer exists for the Williams scheme. This is similar to
publishing a set of possible messages as discussed in section 7.4.
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9 GENERAL A TTA CKS ON THE RA BIN SCHEME
9.1 INTRODUCTION
General attacks on the Rabin scheme are introduced in this chapter including how: 1) a
repeated encryption attack can always be launched; 2) the Pollard algorithm can be used for a
repeated encryption attack; 3) the equivalence of decryption to factoring enables a chosen ciphertext
attack; 4) the equivalence of decryption to factoring does not contribute to other attacks; 5) the
equivalence of decryption to factoring contributes to possible signature attacks; and 6) Rabin added
patches to protect his scheme from signature attacks. These potential attacks are all byproducts from
an investigation of Rabin scheme properties.
9.2 A REPEA TED ENCRYPTION ATTACK CAN AL WA YS BE LA UNCH ED
If the cryptanalyst repeatedly encrypts messages, he will eventually enter a loop. Once in the
loop, he can take the differences between the cryptograms in the loop. One of the differences will
always be cp or cq. We can define the original message to be m, the original cryptogram to be z, and
the last cryptogram which encrypts to the original cryptogram to be z'. After repeated encryption the
loop entered has one of the following properties: 1) z' minus n is cp or cq; 2) z' equals the m; 3)
z' minus z is cp or cq; or 4) z' plus m is r. If one repeatedly encrypts by using the message first and
using the resulting cryptograms thereafter, one will eventually find p or q, which will enable one to
break the Rabin scheme; or find m1, the desired message; or to find r, which provides no useful
information. Depending on the choice of m and the value of p and q a the loop may be very short,
which enables quick determination of p or q. If the wrong m is chosen, it may lead to case 4) for
which a different m must be tried. Therefore, this attack of repeated encryption may be very
dangerous to potential users, and the users must be careful to choose the p's which make the loops
long instead of short. As p and q are increased, the loops also increase in length. The repeated
encryption attack discussed so far is for b=O. If b#O, then the repeated encryption attack reduces to
the Pollard's algorithm for factoring r.
The chances of a successful repeated encryption attack are highly dependent on which of the
four cases is encountered. The repeated encryption attack is successful if cases 1) through 3) occur.
If one of the first three cases does not occur, then the best thing to do is to choose another m for
repeated encryption. The speed of the repeated encryption attack will depend on the length of the
repeated encryption loop. If messages corresponding to shorter loops for repeated encryption can
easily be found, then the repeated encryption attack can be used very quickly to extract p or q.
We can lower bound the probability of success for the repeated encryption attack. For large
r, most of the cryptograms will be four-solutions cryptograms. If we choose a message, mn that is a
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two-solutions message, n we will be successful. However, if the message, m, is a four-solutions
message the result of the repeated encryption attack will fall in one or more of the four cases. The
probability of case 1) or 4) is about 1/4, and of case 2) is about 1/2. We will succeed if either the
original message is found or one of the primes is found, so we succeed if our attack falls into case 1),
2) or 3). Since case 3) only occurs with case 4), the probability of case 3) is less than 1/4. Therefore,
our probability of success using the repeated encryption attack is greater than 3/4.
9.3 A VARIA TION OF POLLARD'S ALGORITHM CAN BE USED FOR A
REPEA TED ENCR YPTION A TTA CK
The Pollard algorithm for factoring large numbers is very similar to the repeated encryption
method discussed in chapter 4. The basic observation of the Pollard algorithm is that for a function
F such that the mapping F:{0, 1, ... , r-1}-+{0, 1, ... , r-11 is random, one chooses numbers x0, X1 .
xj from the set {O, 1, ... r-1} and computes the equivalences:
x= f(x 1 )
xl= fxj 2 )
x R2j)'
then the occurrence of cycling will occur in O(r ) steps.
x and x2j for j = 1, 2, ... . Then the occurrence x =x2j
of the rho. Rho is the shape that the cryptograms trace
of the rho is the number of times the function must be
of the rho or the cycle part of the rho.
The way to detect the cycle is to compute
will happen before i>k, where k is the tail
as they are repeatedly encrypted. The tail
calculated before the x's get into the head
For a polynomial function F, the easiest to calculate is usually chosen to be
F(x)=x 2 ±1 (mod r),
where r=p*q
mapping from
rhos that can
in the Rabin scheme. However, in the Rabin scheme the function F is also a
the sets 10, 1, ..., p-1} and {0,1,...,q-1} onto themselves, so that there are two smaller
be multiplied together to get the one large rho for r.
Therefore, when x =x 2j on one of the smaller rhos, the function has already started to cycle
on the smaller rho, and the g.c.d.(x 2j-xj, r)= p or q, whichever is smaller. When x =x 2j for the
larger rho, and the g.c.d.(x 2j-xj, r)= p or q, whichever prime is larger. Therefore, the Pollard
method will work if one schecks each time for the g.c.d.(x2 j-x , r)= p or q. This method expects to
find one of the smallest prime, say p, in order O(p '/2) time, and all the prime factors in O(r ) time
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regardless of the number of factors. This method is almost equivalent to the repeated encryption
method discussed before, except that method used here is the function x± 1 instead of x2.
9.4 THE EQUIVALENCE OF DECRYPTION TO FACTORING ENABLES A
CHOSEN CIPHERTEXT A TTACK
The proof of equivalence of decryption to factorization of r enables a chosen ciphertext attack,
defined as an attack in which one set of plaintext-ciphertext pairs is known and the cryptanalyst has a
black box, which represents the decryption mechanism. In the Rabin scheme if a plaintext-ciphertext
pair, m-+z; is known, then it is possible to mount a chosen ciphertext attack, by sending z as the
ciphertext to the receiver. If the receiver decrypts the ciphertext, z, and the sender acquires the
decrypted ciphertext, in1 , then the sender knows a pair of solutions to the decryption of z. Therefore,
if the decryption algorithm is random, the sender has a 50% chance of breaking the Rabin scheme:
mf=mrn, (mod p), and n=-in (mod q), or
m=-mt (mod p), and m=m, (mod q).
So with probability of one has
(m-m,r) = p or q.
Therefore, the chance of a chosen ciphertext attack on the Rabin scheme is very high, if the
receiver gives out the decrypted ciphertext.
9.5 THE EQUIVA LENCE OF DECRYPTION TO FACTORING DOES NOT
CONTRIBUTE TO OTHER A TTA CKS
9.5.1 HOW PROOF OF EQUIVA LENCE OF DECRYPTION TO
FA CTORIZA TION OF R DOES NOT CONTRIBUTE TO CHOSEN PLAINTEXT
A TTA CK
The proof of equivalence of decryption to factorization of r does not contribute to chosen
plaintext attacks. A chosen plaintext attack is defined as an attack in which the cryptanalyst has a
black box, which represents the encryption mechanism, and can always be launched in a public-key
cryptosystem. Therefore, the chosen plaintext attack does not help the cryptanalyst otherwise all
public-key systems would be insecure. Since decryption was proven equivalent to factorization, the
chance that the cryptanalyst can break the scheme with only a chosen plaintext attack is as slight as
that of factoring r.
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The cryptanalyst has the plaintext and ciphertext of any plaintext he wishes. If the
cryptanalyst can somehow get the receiver to decrypt the ciphertext for him, the cryptanalyst then
once again has a chosen ciphertext attack, as previously discussed.
9.5.2 HOW PROOF OF EQUIVA LENCE OF DECRYPTION TO
FA CTORIZA TION OF R DOES NOT CONTRIBUTE TO KNOWN CIPHERTEXT
ATTA CK
The proof of equivalence of decryption to factorization of r does not contribute to ciphertext
attack. A ciphertext attack is defined as an attack in which the cryptanalyst tries to break the scheme
with only the ciphertext. This is even more difficult than a chosen plaintext attack, since the
cryptanalyst does not even know what the plaintext is. The only hope for the cryptanalyst is to factor
r, so the problem is once again reduced to factoring r.
9.5.3 110 V PROOF OF EQUIVA LENCE OF DECRYPTION TO
FA CTORIZA TION OF R DOES NOT CONTRIBUTE TO KNOWN PLAINTEXT-
CIPHER TEXT PA IR A TTA CK
The proof of equivalence of decryption to factorization of r does not contribute enough to a
plaintext-ciphertext pair attack to make such an attack dangerous. A plaintext-ciphertext pair attack is
defined as an attack in which the cryptanalyst has a plaintext-ciphertext pair. This attack is a
degenerate chosen plaintext attack in which the cryptanalyst only has plaintext-ciphertext pairs and
cannot produce any more. The possibility of a successful attack using this method relies heavily on
chance. If the cryptanalyst can somehow have the receiver decrypt the ciphertext for one of the
plaintext-ciphertext pairs, then the cryptanalyst has a probability of of breaking the scheme under
the same analysis as the chosen ciphertext attack. If the cryptanalyst finds two plaintext-ciphertext
pairs with the same ciphertext, then the cryptanalyst has a probability of of breaking the scheme
under the same analysis as the chosen ciphertext attack. Therefore, unless the cryptanalyst is very
lucky and is able to find two plaintext-ciphertext with the same ciphertext, or is able to have the
receiver produce another set of plaintext for a given ciphertext, there is very little chance of breaking
the scheme.
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9.6 THE EQUIVA LENCE OF DECRYPTION TO FACTORING
CONTRIBUTES TO POSSIBLE SIGNA TURE A TTA CK
9.6.1 HOW REDUCTION OF FA CTOR ING TO FORGING SIGNA TURES IS
UNDESIRA BLE
This section will deal with signature attacks, especially how reduction of factoring to forging
signatures is undesirable. If the Rabin signature scheme involved only decryption of the message
using one's decryption key, then the cryptanalyst could launch a signature attack by having the user
sign any message. If the user signs the message that is the ciphertext part of a known plaintext-
ciphertext pair, and the cryptanalyst acquires the signature then he has launched a chosen ciphertext
attack. Therefore, it is unwise to have the signature scheme equivalent to decryption for the Rabin
scheme. Rabin patches this problem in his own scheme.
Suppose factoring can be reduced to forging signatures, then one can factor by forging
signatures. If factoring were proven equivalent to forging signatures, then the cryptanalyst could
simply have a user sign a ciphertext message, and acquire the signature in order to launch a chosen
ciphertext attack. If is successful, then the cryptanalyst can factor r and break the scheme; however,
if the reduction of factoring to forging signatures is not possible, then he cannot factor r even though
he can forge signatures. Therefore, the reduction of factoring to forging signatures is undesirable and
paradoxical since normally one would like to prove equivalence to factoring r to strengthen one's
scheme. In this case it weakens the scheme.
9.6.2 RA BIN ADDED PA TCHES TO PROT ECT HIS SCH EME FROM
SIGNA TURE A TTA CKS
The Rabin signature scheme provides patch so that factorization is not equivalent to forging
signatures. Suppose that a user S, wants to sign a message, mn, so he adds an additional suffix word,
s, of an agreed upon length to the message. The suffix is the output of some random function for
each message to be signed. Let I be the concatenation function. User S compresses the new message
mis by a hashing function,
C(mIs) =c,
such that c<r. The computation of C is known publicly, so anyone can check the correctness of c.
Then user S must check if the equation,
x(x+b)=c (mod r), (*
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is still solvable. This means that n=c+d 2 is a quadratic residue (mod p) and (mod q), and is
essentially solving (njp) and (nlq), which can be done in a g.c.d. type fashion. If the resulting
equation is not solvable, then the user S chooses another random sp and then tries c, to see if it
satisfies equation (*). When user S finds an si that produces a solvable ci, then he solves it for x.
Therefore user S does not take the square root of any messages that are potential cryptograms, thus
insuring invulnerability to a signature attack.
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10 GENERAL ATTACKS ON THE WILLIAMS SCHEME
10.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses general attacks on the Williams scheme, including how: 1) the
equivalence of decryption to factoring enables a chosen ciphertext attack; 2) the equivalence of
decryption to factoring does not contribute to possible signature attacks; 3) the equivalence of
decryption to factoring does not contribute to other attacks; 4) Williams added patches to protect his
scheme from chosen ciphertext and signature attacks; and 5) there is no repeated encryption attack
or Pollard's algorithm attack on the Williams scheme.
10.2 THE EQUIVALENCE OF DECR YPTION TO FACTORING ENA BLES
A CHOSEN CHIPHIER T EXT A TTA CK
This section discusses a chosen ciphertext attack against the Williams scheme. In this attack,
the cryptanalyst chooses a ciphertext encrypted in the wrong manner and introduces it into the system
as real ciphertext. The cryptanalyst hopes that the receiver believes the ciphertext to be authentic,
and consequently releases the decoded chosen ciphertext which will enable the cryptanalyst to fird p
or q. Let the cryptanalyst, A, select an X such that 2(2X+1)(r and (2*X+ 1|r)= 1. Then A sends
K=(2(2*X+1))2 e (mod r) to receiver B, which is normally K'=(4(2*X+ 1))2e. If B believes that it is
an authentic ciphertext, then he will calculate M =)() 2(K)) (mod r), and if A can somehow get M
from B, then A can break B's system with probability 1. This is different than in the Rabin scheme
where the probability of breaking the system is only even if A acquires the decrypted chosen
ciphertext.
The method by which A can break B's system is fairly simple. A calculates D=((D1)~1(M)),
and then notes that D=(2(2*X+1))2ed=2(2*x+1)(2(2*x+1))(p-1Xq-)1/4. Since A knows X and D, he
can calculate (2(2*X+1))(p-1)(q-l)/4. Since
(2(2*X + 1)|r) = -1,
A can factor B's r by simply calculating
((2(2*X+1))(q-1)(p-1)/ 4 -1,r)=p or q.
The reason is as follows: since (2(2*X+1)|r)=-1, one must have either
(2(2*X+1)|p)=1, or
(2(2*X+ 1)|q)=1.
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If this is so then we have either
(2(2*X + 1))(p-1 )/2 =1 (mod p), or
(2(2*X + 1))(q-1)/2= (mod q),
which implies,
(2(2*X+1))(p1Xq~1)/4=1 (mod p), or
(2(2*X+1))(-1Xp-1)/4=1 (mod q), respectively,
which implies,
((2(2*X+1))(p-')(q-1)/4-)=0 (mod p), or
((2(2*X+1))(p-1(q-1)/4-)=0 (mod q), respectively,
which implies,
pI((2(2*X+1))(.-1)(q~1)/4- 1, or
ql((2(2*X+1))(p-1)(-l)/4-1, respectively,
which implies,
((2(2*X_, 1))(p-1)q-1)/ 4-I,r)= p or q.
Without a patch the Williams scheme is vulnerable to this attack, therefore Williams later
added a patch.
10.3 THE EQUIVALENCE OF DECRYPTION TO FACTORING DOES NOT
CONTRIBUTE TO POSSIBLE SIGNA TURE A TTA CK
The signature attack proposed on the Rabin scheme if the signature were merely a decryption
or square-root function does not apply here. In fact, because of the way Williams set up his signature
scheme, there is no need for patching the signature scheme, and it is not equivalent to factoring. This
is so because his signature scheme does not decrypt the input, but rather performs half of an
encryption and half of a decryption. The signature for some user, A, with some message, M, is not
S=D 2 A()IA(M)), but is S=D2 A(EIA(M)). This signature can then be checked by solving
DIA(E 2 A(S))= I A(E2A(D2 A(FIA(M))))= M (mod r).
This will obviously be true if the original message was M, because
E2A(D2A(M))=(M) 2ed=D12A(E2A(M)) (mod r).
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Only the user A could have made the signature, S, since he is the only one with the decryption
function, D2 A
If user A signs a message, he will not provide B with enough useful information for factoring
r. For the cryptanalyst B can only obtain S=)2A(EA(M)), M, and EIA(M). In this case
(ElA(M)Ir)= 1, so B has insufficient enough information to factor r.
On the other hand, if A made a mistake and his first encryption function was such that
(ElA(M)|r)=-1, then B can factor r. If B knows that (EA(M)|r)=-1, then B gives A a message, M,
such that (2*M+ l)|R)=1. Since A's first encryption function is non-Jacobi, (ElA(M)|r)=-1, he will
use ELA to get (2(2*M+1)). Since (21r)=-1, we have that ((2(2*M+1))Ir)=-1. User A will sign the
message as
S= D2 ^((E'^(M))=(2(2*M +1))2d (mod r).
Then B receives the signed message, S, and calculates
E2A(S)=(2(2*M+ 1))2ed-2(2*M+l)(2(2*M+ 1 ))(p-1)(q-1)/4 (mod r),
so B can solve for (2(2*M +1))(P)-1)/ 4 (mod r).
A can factor B's r by simply calculating
((2(2*X + 1))(q-'p1)/41,r) = p or q. (**)
The reason for this is as follows: since (2(2*X+1)Ir)=-1, one must have either
(2(2*X+1)p)=1, or
(2(2*X+ 1)|q)= 1.
If this is so then we have either:
(2(2*X+1))(p- 1)2=1 (mod p) or
(2(2*X+ 1))(q-1)/2=1 (mod q),
which implies,
(2(2*X+1))(p-1)(q-1)/4=I (mod p) or
(2(2*X+1))(q-]Xp-1)/4=1 (mod q), respectively,
which implies,
((2(2*X + 1 ))(p-1)(q-1)/4-1) =0 (mod p) or
((2(2*X+ 1))(p-1Xq-1)/4--1)=0 (mod q), respectively,
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which implies,
pI((2(2*X +1))(p-1)(-1)/4.1
q|((2(2*X+1))(p-1)(q-l)/4-1, respectively,
which implies,
((2(2*X+1))(p~1)(q-1)/4-1,r)= p or q.
If, on the other hand, (EIA(M)Ir)= 1, then the first encryption of M will be (4(2*M+ 1)) (mod
r). Since (41r) = 1, we have ((4(2*M + 1))|r) = 1. Repeating the above procedure, we obtain the same
results with (4(2*M+1)) replacing (2(2*M+1)) down to step (**). At step (**) we have the
following:
((4(2*M + 1))(p-1)q-1)/r-1,r)#p or q.
The reason for this is as follows: since (4(2*X+1)r)=1, either
(4(2*X+1)fp)=l and (4(2*X+I)|q)=1. or
(4(2*X+1)p)= -1 and (4(2*X+1)|q)=-1.
If this is so then either
(4(2*X+1))(p-1)/2=1 (mod p) and
(4(2*X+ 1))(q-1 )/2=1 (mod q), or
(4(2*X+1))(p W'2=-l (mod p) and
(4(2*X+ 1))(q-1)/2=-1 (mod q),
which implies,
(4(2*X+1))(p-Xq-)/ 4 =1 (mod p) and
(4(2*X+1))(p-1)q-1)/4=1 (mod q), or
(4(2*X+1))(q-1Xp-l)/4=-1 (mod p) and
(4(2*X+1))(q-)(p-1)/4=-l (mod q), respectively,
which implies,
((4(2*X+1))(P -I)(q-1)/4-1)=0 (mod p) and
((4(2*X+ 1 ))(-1)(q-I)/4- 1)= 0 (mod q), or
((4(2*X+1))(p-1)(q-1)/4+1)=0 (mod p) and
((4(2*X+1))(p-1)(q-l)/4+1)=0 (mod q), respectively,
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which implies,
pI((4(2*X+ 1))(p-1X-1)/ 4-1 and
qi((4(2*X+1))(,-1X-l)/ 4-1, or
pi((4(2*X+ 1))(p-lXq-)/4+1 and
ql((4(2*X +1 ))(p-1Xq-1)/4 + 1, respectively,
which implies,
((4(2*X+1))(p-1)(q-1)/ 4-,r)= 1 or r.
So the Williams signature scheme seems to be secure against signature attacks without making
a patch. Since the Williams scheme is not vulnerable to signature attacks, his signature scheme is
essentially a patch built into his public-key scheme.
10.4 EQUIVA LENCE OF DECR YPTION TO FACTORING DOES NOT
CON TRIBUTE TO OTHER A TTA CKS
In this case the equivalence of decryption to factorization of r again contributes to chosen
ciphertext attack but not to the other forms of attack. Since decryption is equivalent to factorization,
the cryptanalyst simply performs a chosen ciphertext attack and retrieves the message corresponding
to the incorrectly encrypted ciphertext, and can then factor r. This situation is somewhat paradoxical,
since proving equivalence of decryption to factorization of r is in some ways beneficial, while in other
ways it is not. One would think that it would always be beneficial, but this is not the case as shown
in the chosen ciphertext attack. Therefore, proof of equivalence of decryption to factorization of r is
not always desirable.
10.5 WILLIAMS ADDED PA TCHES TO PROTECT HIS SCHEME FROM
CHOSEN C1IPHE? TEXT AND SIGNA TURE A TTA CKS
To solve the problem for the ciphertext attack, Williams proposes a patch to make his system
secure from this attack. To avoid the chosen ciphertext attack, each user B of the system requests
user A to send
E'(M), Q, and C(M,) 2 A(EIA(Q)),
inplace of sending only E'(M). Q should also change each time a new message is sent, where Q is
some plaintext message subject to sonic previously agreed upon conditions. The function, C(K,N), is
a conventionally cryptographic function where K is the key and N is the message. The cryptanalyst
cannot determine M from E(M) or find D2A(FIA(Q)) without factoring r. Thus, he cannot
determine M from C(M, )2A(EIA(Q)), even if he knows the form of C.
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This procedure protects B from a chosen ciphertext attack. Suppose A sends B some X,
which is supposed to be ENB(M). Using X, B calculates M, and using M as the key for C(M,
D2 A(EIA(Q))), B can retrieve ) 2A(EIA(Q)). He can then determine if M was indeed a valid message,
since he can check whether:
DIA(E 2A(D2A(EIA( L ))))-Q (*)
is true. If it is not true, then B knows something is wrong, and if it is, then A cannot be tricking B,
since he already knows M. The equation (*) serves as a signature scheme for M.
10.6 THERE IS NO REPEA TED ENCRYPTION OR POLLARD'S
A LGORIT HM A TTA CK ON THE WILLIA MS SCHEME
There is no real possibility of a repeated encryption attack or Pollard's algorithm attack against
the Williams scheme. '[his is because one cannot always encrypt a cryptogram, C, since (2(2*C+ 1))<r
for ((2*C+1)|r)=-1, or (4(2*C+1))<r for ((2*C+1)ir)= 1, may not always be true so a repeated
encryption attack cannot be launched.
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11 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
11.1 INTRODUCTION
We conclude that the Rabin and Williams schemes have some potential problems, and that
users of such schemes should be aware of possible chosen ciphertext attacks. In chapter nine and ten
several methods of attack on the Rabin and Williams schemes were presented. Some were more
promising than others, hence it is very important for each user to choose the p's, b's and m's with
great care to prevent possible attack.
The ciphertext should not be decrypted and randomly revealed publicly. Rather, one should
ensure that the sender knows the decrypted message, otherwise the decrypted message could be used
to launch a chosen ciphertext attack. The reason for the possible differences in the decrypted
message and the original message is caused by the multiple decryptions in the Rabin scheme and is
caused by a non-Jacobi ciphertext in the Williams scheme. The security against the chosen ciphertext
attack can be accomplished in both the Rabin and the Williams schemes with the patch by Williams,
but this is impractical and implementation of the secure RSA scheme maybe more feasible.
If primes are chosen such that they differ by a small amount, then the number of two-
solutions, the number of z's and m's being cp or cq, and the length of the repeated encryption attack
loops are all minimized. However, if the primes are chosen such that they differ by a small amount,
then a particular prime will be about s and it will be easy to factor. Therefore the chosen
primes should be close enough to minimize the above effects and differ enough to make the factoring
of r difficult. Although this choice may be difficult, it is essential for minimization of cryptanalytic
attack.
The b's should also be chosen unequal to cp or eq, and so it is not known how close they are
to cp or eq. It is unwise to change the b's very often, since then the cryptanalyst has a greater chance
of finding cp or cq. Pollard's algorithm for factoring r does not work for b=0. Therefore, it seems
that the use of the parameter b is more detrimental than helpful. The use of b's actually helps the
cryptanalyst, so it is recommended that the use of b's should be eliminated in order to reduce the risk
of potential attacks.
The choice of m's is very important. The m's must not be cp or eq or cause a two-solutions
cryptogram; otherwise, potential attacks are possible. Even if all of the input parameters are
carefully chosen to ensure no possible leak of information on the primes, the chance of successful
potential attacks exists by using the repeated encryption algorithm to break the scheme. This is
because a chosen plaintext attack can always be attempted on any public-key scheme, and there is no
way to prevent the cryptanalyst from trying a repeated encryption attack.
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The ambiguity problem must be solved with either additional code bits or by switching to the
Williams scheme.
Therefore, at present, the Rabin and the Williams schemes may not be suitable for high-speed
satellite communications due to the threat of a chosen ciphertext attack. Strengthening the Rabin and
the Williams schemes with a patch will require extra computation and time, so one may favor the
RSA scheme in order to avoid the chosen ciphertext attack.
11.2 DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The method described below details how cryptanalysis was done on the Rabin scheme. Many
different pairs of primes were used, and all possible m's were encrypted for each pair of primes in an
attempt to find as many properties as possible. Many plots were also used. One of the possible areas
of future research is to attempt to use this type of cryptanalysis on future public-key schemes. Some
of the properties of the schemes are initially extracted mathematically, others can be found by using
computer simulation. Once the properties have been found, the person attempting cryptanalysis can
concentrate on using the properties to find possible attacks on the scheme.
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